3. Something

Existence as reality is the differentiating of its own self into being-in-itself and being-for-other. Herein being-in-itself is as differentiated from being-for-other; but it thereby is only as referred to it, and in unity with it. Just so being-for-other is not otherness itself, but holds within itself the reference to its own self, being-in-itself. These two unities accordingly make up, in their very difference, One unity, and are the passing over into one another.

Existence at first, as such, is only the immediate unity of being and nothing. Reality is this unity in the determinate difference of its moments, which make up distinct sides on it, determinations of reflection that are indifferent toward one another. But because each one is only as standing in reference to the other, and each encloses the other within itself, reality ceases to be a unity of the sort in which both subsist indifferently. It is a unity that does not let them subsist, their sublating simple unity. Existence is being-within-itself, and as being-within-itself it is an existent, or something.

The being-within-itself of existence is thus the simple reference of existence to its own self, as being-in-itself is. But being-in-itself is this equality with self rather in an immediate manner; in being-in-itself the moment of being is what lies at the ground, and being-for-other stands over against it. This can be put as follows, that being-in-itself is the reference of existence to its own self, not as the existence's own reflection into itself, but as an external one; or only through this, that being-for-other gets severed from the reference to self. — Being-within-itself, on the other hand, is now existence's own being-in-itself; it is its reflection into itself. Existence is the unity which is reality, insofar as this unity has distinct sides, that is, reality is the immediate unity, yet referred to that external reflection which distinguishes distinct sides. Being-within-itself, by contrast, is the reference of existence to itself insofar as the sublating of being-for-other is existence's own; being-for-other passes over on its own self into being-in-itself, and this is thereby no longer immediate being-in-itself, but that which has likewise united itself with its other moment, and in which being-for-other is sublated, or being-within-itself.

Something determines itself further, more closely, as being-for-itself, or thing, substance, subject, and so forth. At the ground of all these determinations lies the negative unity; the reference to self through negation of otherness. Something is this negative unity of being-within-itself as yet only quite indeterminately.

Existence passes over into an existent within its own self, by gaining, as the sublating of being-for-other, this point of negative unity. Existence therefore, as something, is not the immediate unity of being and nothing that is; rather, as being-within-itself it has reference to itself insofar as it is negation. The being of something therefore does not consist in its immediacy, but in the non-being of otherness; within something, then, existence has passed over into the negative to this extent, that the negative now lies at the ground. Something is existence only insofar as it has a determinateness.

B. Determinateness

Existence is being with a non-being. It is being, simple reference to its own self, yet no longer as immediacy, but as negative reference to its own self, and this is what makes up its being. So taken it is something. Here, then, the moment of non-being turns itself outward on existence.

Something, as an existent, first of all distinguishes its moment of negativity from its own self, as its limit.

Thereupon, however, the limit shows itself as the essentiality of something, and is its determinateness, which differentiates itself into determinateness as that which is in itself, into determination, and into determinateness as that which is for-other, into constitution. Determinateness, as the reference of these moments, is quality.

Third, however, quality passes over through constitution into alteration.

1. Limit

1. Something is first an existence enclosed in general; it contains within itself the non-being of otherness; a non-being through which it is, as being-within-itself.

Secondly, as existence it is indeed being-for-other; but being-for-other is taken back into being-in-itself. This means, on the one side, that otherness has not vanished; but because something, precisely on the ground of its having returned into itself, is simple being-within-itself, otherness falls outside it. This other is another something, towards which the something is indifferent; it is, whether this other be, or not be, or however it be. The something is being-in-itself, and indeed over against the other; this being-in-itself makes up its indifference. — The first being-in-itself of existence is immediate being-in-itself; being-within-itself, by contrast, is likewise being-in-itself, yet not as immediate, but a being-in-itself that is negative, over against an other, or the being-in-itself. That has stepped out, into being-for-other. — In this, then, that existence is determined as indifferent, the other first properly steps over against an existence; into otherness, as it appeared earlier, existence had itself passed over; this unity of the two developed into the moments considered, through whose negative unity, being-within-itself, existence severs itself from otherness and sets the two in indifferent reference to each other.

Thirdly, however, because being-within-itself is the non-being of otherness, something is not something indifferent in general; rather, the non-being of the other is an essential moment of its indifference; it is the ceasing of an other in it.

Something therefore contains the three moments 1) its non-being, the other is outside it; it itself is self-equal reference to itself, 2) the other is not an other in general, or in an external reflection, but ceases in the something, something is its non-being; 3) something thereby has non-being itself in it, but as the ceasing of its otherness, and thus as the being of its own self.

It has a limit.

Something has a limit at first only in relation to an other; that limit is the other's non-being, not the something's own; through it, therefore, the something does not limit itself, but its other.

2. But the other is itself a something in general, for it is likewise existence. The limit, then, which something holds towards the other, is at the same time the other's own limit as a something, or it is that other's limit, by which the other holds off the first something as its other, or is a non-being of that something. It is therefore not only the non-being of the other, but of the something as well; it is at the something itself.

Or, immediately, insofar as the something only is as the non-being of the other, it is in its own self non-being, and the limit is just as much that by which it is itself limited.

3. As non-being it is the ceasing of the something, but since it is essentially the ceasing of the other, the something at the same time is through its limit. — The other is likewise the non-being of the something, but if the limit were only this non-being, then something would simply cease in its limit; yet it is the non-being of the something only in such a way that it is at once the non-being of the other, and hence the being of the something.

Insofar, now, as something in its limit is and is not, and these moments are at first taken in immediate distinctness, the non-existence and the existence of the something fall apart from each other. Something has its existence outside its limit; but just so the other too, because it is a something, lies outside that limit. The limit is the middle of the two, in which they cease. They have their existence over beyond one another and beyond their limit; the limit, being what each of them is not, counts for both as the other, and so each has its existence apart from its own non-being.

— According to this diversity of the something from its limit, the line appears to us as line only outside its limit, the point; the surface as surface outside the line; the body as body only outside the surface that bounds it. — This is the side from which limit at first enters representation, — the concept's being-outside-itself, — and in which it is therefore taken up chiefly in spatial objects too.

4. Further, however, the something as it is outside the limit, the unlimited something, is merely existence in general. Outside the limit something is not distinguished from its other; it is only existence, and so it has the same determination as its other; each is only something in general, or each is an other.

But something is something only through being-within-itself; and it is within itself only through the non-being of an other; without limit it is its other. Its being turned outward against an other, the non-being that is its limit, thus makes up what is essential to the something, or its existence. Something is what it is only in its limit.

Being-within-itself, as simple reference to itself, at first shuts otherness and with it the limit itself — as the reference to the other — out of itself and out of the something. But the equality of the something with itself rests on its negative nature; or non-being is here being-in-itself itself; hence the limit is being-within-itself. Above, the being-within-itself of the something was determined thus, that it is being-for-other taken up into being-in-itself; being-in-itself over against an other was the indifference of the something towards an other. But conversely otherness, or the non-being of the something, is thereby posited as being-in-itself, which has no other content or subsistence than the limit itself.

— The point, then, is not the limit of the line merely in the sense that the line ceases in it and is, as existence, outside it; — nor the line the limit of the surface merely in the sense that the surface ceases in the line, and likewise the surface as limit of the body. Rather, the line begins in the point as well; the point is the line's absolute beginning, it constitutes its element, as the line constitutes the element of the surface; the surface that of the body. These limits are thus at the same time the principle of what they limit; as the one, for instance as the hundredth, is a limit, but also an element of the whole hundred.

The limit is therefore not distinguished from the something; this non-being is rather its ground, and makes it what it is; it makes up its being, or its being does not reach out beyond its otherness, beyond its negation. Thus the limit is determinateness.

2. Determinateness

The limit belongs to the something itself; the something has no existence apart from it; the limit is the being-in-itself of the something itself; it is not external to the something's being-within-itself, but is itself a limit that is within itself. Its truth is determinateness in general. — This is the result of the foregoing. — When the limit alters, the something seems still to remain as an existence in general, and the alteration seems to go on outside it, only in the limit. But as the limit is in truth, namely as determinateness, (the qualitative, not yet the quantitative limit) it is that through which something is what it is; when determinateness vanishes, something itself vanishes, or when another determinateness steps into the place of one determinateness, something itself is an other.

Something has a determinateness. In this expression the something and its determinateness are distinguished from each other. But this distinction belongs to external reflection. Something is the determinate; it stands in simple immediate unity with determinateness. Something therefore vanishes in its determinateness; properly speaking, then, one should no longer speak so much of the something as of determinateness. For something is being-within-itself in an immediacy; according to this immediacy it has negation, the limit, only in it, as being-for-other, and something is in itself over against the limit; but in unity with the limit it is sublated, for its immediacy has vanished, and it has passed over into determinateness.

Simple determinateness is the unity of being-within-itself and of the limit. It contains both within itself as sublated, as moments, or it is itself determined in this twofold manner. On the one side it is the limit turned back into itself, on the other side it is also being-within-itself that has passed over into being-for-other, or that is as limit.

a.) Determination

As the limit turned back into itself, determinateness is in itself; it is the determinate as referring only to itself; as the non-being of the other, in such a way that the determinate is not thereby limited itself.

Determinateness on this side may more precisely be called determination. In its determination something rests within its own self; in determination it is what it ought to be. There is indeed an other outside it, yet in such a way that something is not what it is in this reference to an other; rather it is taken back out of the reference to an other into itself. Limit as determination is no longer the referring middle between the something and an other; it belongs to the something alone, which does not hold it in common, but it is the something's reference to its own self.

b.) Constitution

Determination makes up the being-in-itself of the something. But determinateness is not only being-in-itself; as limit it is also being-for-other, or being-within-itself that has passed over into otherness. Determinateness is at first indifference towards an other, and the other falls outside the something. Yet at the same time, since the limit belongs to the something itself, the something has otherness in its own self. In this way determinateness is an external existence of the something, one that is indeed its existence, but that does not belong to its being-in-itself.

Determinateness is thus constitution.

Constituted this way or that, something is grasped not as being within itself, but as standing under external influence and external relation. This determinateness, which does indeed belong to the something, is rather its otherness, but insofar as that otherness is in it. The external reference on which constitution depends, and the being-determined through an other, appears as something contingent, because it appears as an other, as something external. But the something consists in being surrendered to this externality and in having a constitution. — Determination is otherness taken back into itself; precisely thereby otherness, instead of being sublated, has rather been made into the determination of determinateness, into its being-in-itself.

c.) Quality

Determinateness is thus at first the simple limit that is within itself. But it thereby has the two moments that have been considered. Determinateness in this closer reflection is quality, which unites in itself the meaning of determination as well as that of constitution. Quality as this union is the determinate nature of something, not as one resting within itself, but insofar as the something has in it at the same time a manner of its own that determines itself through the reference to an other.

Insofar as, in their separate consideration, determination and constitution were distinguished from each other, something taken according to its determination is indifferent towards its constitution. But the two are essentially moments of one and the same, or more precisely constitution is properly the limit contained in determination itself. Constitution, insofar as it appears at the same time to be grounded in something external, in an other in general, therefore depends on determination as well, and the alien determination is at once determined by the something's own, immanent determination. Conversely constitution belongs to what the something is in itself; with its constitution something alters.

Remark

Quality in this respect is preeminently property, in that it shows itself in an external reference as an immanent determination. For by properties, for instance those of herbs, one understands determinations that are not merely proper to a something in general, but that are proper to it insofar as it thereby comports itself in a peculiar manner in reference to other things, and does not let the alien effects posited in it hold sway within it, but rather shows its restriction as a being-within-itself, and makes that restriction tell in its otherness — although it does not keep that otherness away from itself. The more inert determinatenesses, for instance figure, shape, magnitude, are on the other hand not readily called properties.

Insofar as one speaks of good or bad quality, quality has the meaning of that one moment of it, of constitution. For good and bad are determinations of judgment concerning the agreement of constitution with determination, with the concept. At the same time, however, this constitution is not a merely unessential, detachable externality, or a mere state, but is a determinateness of the being of the matter itself. Constitution is not sundered from determination; rather, as the matter is constituted, so it also is. Quality is just this, that determinateness, distinguished into determination and constitution, is essentially the unity of both moments.

The Qualirung or Inqualirung of a philosophy that goes into the depths, but into a murky depth, refers to determinateness insofar as it is in itself, but is at the same time an other in itself; or it refers to the closer nature of opposition as it is in essence, insofar as opposition makes up the inner nature of quality and essentially its self-movement within itself. In that philosophy Qualirung therefore signifies the movement of a determinateness within its own self, insofar as in its negative nature (in its Qual) it posits and secures itself out of an other, is in general the unrest that it has in its own self, according to which it brings itself forth and maintains itself only in struggle.

3. Alteration

Determinateness is quality, reflected determinateness, insofar as it has the two sides, that of determination and that of constitution.

The latter is determinateness insofar as it is otherness in its own self. The limit, as the being of external determinations, makes up constitution; but it is determinateness itself that is this limit, and the externality is therefore its own externality of its own self. Since, then, something in its determinateness is in its own self its non-being, or since its determinateness is just as much its other as it is its own, a becoming is here posited which is alteration.

Alteration lies necessarily already in existence itself; existence is the unity of being and nothing, it is in itself becoming. But it is becoming that has become an immediate unity. Insofar as it develops itself again into becoming, it is not the abstract moments of being and nothing, into which it falls apart, that make up what passes over, but the moments as proceeding out of existence, out of the unity of being and nothing, as such as are themselves these unities, these moments being the being-within-itself of the something, and the other; — not as moments of external reflection, like being-in-itself and being for other — but as immanent moments of existence itself. In determination, otherness, which at first is as limit, is taken back into simple determinateness, or determination is itself the simple unity of both moments. But constitution is the reference of these moments as being other to one another, or as distinguished, and their reference in one and the same respect; hence their sublating in their own selves.

a) Alteration of Constitution

Alteration at first falls only into constitution; determination is the limit withdrawn from the reference to an other; constitution, by contrast, is the side open to the other, or the side in which the other is as other. To that extent there is still a being-within-itself present in determination, one that is distinct from constitution and from alteration; the something is still present and surrenders only the one of its sides. — Becoming is here more closely determined as alteration for this reason too, that it is not purely abstract moments that stand in reference, but such as are themselves unities of each other, whereby determination maintains itself in the passing over, and whereby here not a vanishing but only a becoming-other is posited.

At first, then, it is constitution that alters in such a way that it becomes only another constitution; for a constitution is a determinate one, and determinateness passes over into alteration. But it is this alteration of determinateness itself that is here considered more closely; determinateness passes over into alteration because it is constitution.

It is therefore the constitution as such that alters; not a constitution, in such a way that constitution as such would remain; hence it must not so much be said that it alters, but rather it is itself the alteration.

b.) The Ought and Restriction

Something maintains itself in the alteration of its constitution; the alteration touches only this unstable surface of otherness, not the determination of the something itself. But it is the constitution of the something that is alteration: that is to say, the otherness of the something, which is in its own self. The constitution of the something is not merely surface; rather the limit is the being-within-itself of the something; or constitution is its determination itself. Above, the two yielded themselves only as different sides for external reflection; but in themselves they are united and undivided in quality; the externality of otherness is the something's own inwardness. Something is determined, it is within itself only through its limit; the limit is the negation of otherness, but thereby otherness is the immanent determination, in itself, of the something itself.

For there is present in the something not merely being-within-itself and its other in general; rather this other of it is its determinateness in itself, namely determination itself. Determination is therefore the being-within-itself that refers to itself, but that, as this being-within-itself, is itself its limit. Being-within-itself, equal to itself, therefore refers to itself as to its own non-being. The limit that thus makes up the determination of the something, but in such a way that it is at once determined as the something's non-being, is restriction.

The being-in-itself of determination, however, in this reference to the limit, namely to itself as restriction, is the ought.

The limit that attaches to existence in general is not restriction. For it to be restriction, existence must at the same time pass out beyond it. Existence must refer to it as to something that is not. The existence of the something lies only quietly, indifferently, as it were alongside its limit. But something passes out beyond its limit only insofar as it is the sublatedness of that limit. And since the limit is determination itself, something thereby passes out beyond its own self.

The ought therefore contains determination doubled, once as determination that is in itself; the other time, however, that same determination as a non-being, as restriction. The ought is determination and the sublatedness of determination itself, and indeed in such a way that just this sublatedness of itself is in it. The ought is thus the reference of determination to itself as to its non-being, or to the non-being that it itself is.

That which ought to be is, and at once is not. Were it, it ought not merely to be. The ought therefore essentially has a restriction. — But further, this restriction is not something alien. That which ought to be is the determination, that is, it is the determinateness of determination itself, which is not. This is what was just now expressed by saying that the ought is determinateness, but equally the sublatedness of this determinateness itself.

What has emerged, then, consists in this: something has a determination; that is, a determinateness which, however, is not to be its limit, not its ceasing, but rather its being-within-itself itself. But it has with this at the same time a limit, or is determined; the sublated limit is preserved. This limit is restriction, and determination is the ought, insofar as determinateness in the simple unity of being-within-itself at once is and is not.

The something's resting within itself in its determination thus lowers itself to the ought, in that the very determinateness which makes up its being-within-itself is at the same time, and in one and the same respect, sublated as well, is as non-being. The restriction of the something is therefore not something outward; rather its own determination is also its restriction.

As ought, something further passes out beyond its restriction, that is, what is not in it, what is sublated, is in it as well; namely the same determinateness, as which it is sublated, is its being-in-itself, and its limit is also not its limit.

As ought, then, something stands elevated over its restriction, yet conversely it possesses its restriction only as ought. Both are inseparable. It has a restriction insofar as it has a determination, and determination is also the sublatedness of restriction.

Remark

The ought has of late played a great role in philosophy, chiefly in reference to morality, and in general also as the ultimate and absolute concept of the identity of equality with oneself and of determinateness.

You can, because you ought, — this expression, which was meant to say a great deal, lies in the concept of the ought. For the ought is the being out beyond the restriction; the limit is sublated in the ought. — But conversely it is just as correct: You cannot, precisely because you ought. For in the ought there lies just as much the restriction as restriction; determinateness makes up determination as being-within-itself; but being-within-itself is essentially as the sublatedness of this determinateness, which is nevertheless being-within-itself itself, and hence determinateness as non-being, as restriction.

In the ought the concept of finitude begins in general, and with it at the same time the passing out beyond finitude, infinity. The ought contains what in further development presents itself as the progress into infinity, in connection with which the nature of the imperfect identity contained in it will be considered more closely.

c.) Negation

1. Existence, determinate being, as the unity of its moments, of being-in-itself and of being-for-other, was above reality.

Determinateness that has become free is, likewise as the unity of determination and of constitution, quality. Over against reality stands negation. Quality makes up the middle and the transition between reality and negation; it contains these two in simple unity. But in negation non-being comes forward as the truth into which reality has passed over.

To the Reelle there also stands opposed the Ideelle, and to the negative the positive. The opposition of the Reelle and the Ideelle will emerge below, with being-for-itself; the opposition of the positive and the negative, however, belongs among the proper determinations of reflection, or is the opposition as it is in essence, and comes forward there. — Insofar as position in general is set over against negation, this position means nothing other than reality.

Just as reality is the same as existence, insofar as existence has in it the moments of being-in-itself and of being-for-other, so negation too may be taken for reflected determinateness, namely according to what has emerged as the truth of that determinateness, namely to be the unity of the ought and of restriction.

Remark

Determinateness in general is negation, (Determinatio est negatio) said Spinoza; — a proposition of thoroughgoing importance; — one that emerged from the consideration of determinateness. For determinateness is essentially the limit and has otherness for its ground; existence is what it is only through its limit; it does not fall outside this its negation. Hence it was necessary that reality passed over into negation; therewith reality makes its ground and essence manifest.

In connection with reality it was noted that the sum total of all realities, if they are thought without limit, becomes the empty nothing. But if they are preserved as determinate realities, then the sum total of all realities becomes just as much the sum total of all negations. This may, since negation has just now determined itself into restriction and finitude, also be called the sum total of all restrictions and finitudes. But restriction and finitude are only this, to sublate themselves; that negation, however, as absolute negativity, is the essential determination of the absolute essence, and the determination higher than reality, will be mentioned provisionally in what immediately follows.

From the proposition that determinateness is negation, the unity of the Spinozist substance, or that there is only One substance, — is a necessary consequence. Thinking and being he had to bring together into one within this unity, since, taken as determinate realities, both are negations, and their infinity or truth lies solely in their unity. He therefore grasped them as attributes, that is, as such as lack any subsistence of their own, any being-in-and-for-itself, and are only as sublated, as moments. — Just as little can the substantiality of individuals hold out against that proposition. For the individual is something limited in all respects; it is individual reference to itself only through this, that it sets limits to everything other; but these limits are thereby also limits of itself, references to an other, and it does not have its existence within itself. The individual is indeed more than merely what is limited on every side; but insofar as it is taken as finite, determinateness essentially asserts itself as negation against the claim that the finite as such should be motionless, something that is, in and for itself, and tears it into the negative movement, out of which, however, there proceeds not its empty nothing but rather, for the first time, its infinity and its being-in-and-for-itself.

2. Determinateness is negation in general. But more precisely negation is the doubled moment of restriction and of the ought.

First: negation is not merely the nothing in general, but negation that is reflected, referred to being-in-itself; the lack as of something, or the restriction; determinateness, posited as what it is in truth, as non-being.

Second: negation as the ought is the determinateness that is in itself, or conversely, the ought is determinateness or negation as being-in-itself. It is to that extent the negation of that first determinateness, which is posited as non-being, as restriction. It is thus negation of negation, and absolute negation.

Thus negation is the genuinely real and being-in-itself. It is this negativity that is the simple, which as sublating of otherness returns into itself; the abstract foundation of all philosophical ideas and of speculative thinking in general, of which one must say that only more recent times have begun to grasp it in its truth. — This simplicity has to step into the place of being, or of every determinateness that is taken in immediate form, as being in and for itself. When negativity or negative nature is spoken of hereafter, what is to be understood by it is not that first negation, the limit, restriction or lack, but essentially the negation of otherness, which, as such, is reference to itself.

Here the negation that is in itself is as yet only the ought, negation of negation indeed, yet in such a way that this negating itself is still the determinateness. It is, namely, the limit or negation which as being-in-itself refers itself to itself as non-being. Both negations, which refer themselves to each other, make up the reference of negation to itself, but they are still others for one another; they bound each other mutually.

These negations, then, which still refer themselves to each other as others, — the negation posited as non-being and the negation that is in itself — the restriction and the ought, make up the (qualitatively) finite and the (qualitatively) infinite, and their reference to each other.

C. (Qualitative) Infinity

1. Finitude and Infinity

Existence is determinate; and determinateness posits itself as negation and restriction through this, that as a determinateness which is within itself it at the same time goes out beyond itself, and refers itself to itself as to its negation. In this way existence is not merely determinate but limited; finite, and it is not merely finite, but it is finitude.

Insofar as we say of things that they are finite, what is understood by this is not merely that they contain a determinateness, — for quality can be taken as determination or also as reality, — but that it is not being, rather non-being as restriction, that makes up their nature.

But what is determinate is finite only in the ought; that is to say, insofar as it goes out beyond itself as beyond its negation. The finite is negation insofar as it is negation to itself, refers itself to itself as to non-being, insofar therefore as the restriction is by it just as much sublated. It is, namely, the limit insofar as this makes up being-in-itself, or the determination, that is to say, just as much insofar as it refers itself to itself, and so is equal to itself. But in this reference of negation to itself consists the sublating of the negation of it, or of its inequality. Determinateness is therefore negation and finitude only insofar as at the same time there is present in it the reference to itself, equality with itself, the sublating of the restriction. The finite is therefore itself this sublating of itself; it is itself this, to be infinite.

As the concept of the infinite has thus emerged, it is the otherness of otherness, the negation of negation, the reference to itself through the sublating of determinateness. — The infinite in this its simple concept can become the second definition of the absolute; this concept is deeper than becoming; but here it is still saddled with a determinateness; and the main thing is to keep the genuine concept of infinity apart from bad infinity, reason's infinite apart from the understanding's infinite.

It first showed itself in determinate existence that existence, in its being-in-itself, determines itself as finite and goes out beyond itself as beyond the restriction. It is therefore in general the nature of the finite itself to go out beyond itself, to negate the negation and to become infinite. The infinite therefore does not stand above the finite as something finished on its own account, so that the finite would have and keep its abiding outside of it or beneath it. Nor is it we, merely as a subjective reason, who go out beyond the finite into the infinite. As when it is said that the infinite is the concept of reason, and that through reason we raise ourselves above the temporal and the finite, this happens quite without prejudice to finitude, which that elevation, remaining external to it, in no way concerns. But insofar as the finite is itself raised into infinity, it is just as little an alien force that does this to it; rather this is its nature, to refer itself to itself as to a restriction, and thus to go out beyond that restriction. For as has been shown, the restriction only is insofar as it is gone out beyond. Infinity in general therefore does not consist in the sublating of finitude in general; rather the finite is only this, to become that itself through its own nature. Infinity is its determination, or that which it is in itself.

2. Reciprocal Determination of the Finite and the Infinite

Infinity is the determination of the finite, but this determination is what is determinate itself. Infinity is therefore itself determinate, reference to an other. But the other to which the infinite refers itself is the finite. Yet they are not merely others in general over against each other; both are negations, but the one is the negation that is in itself, the other the negation as not being in itself, negation as non-being, as something sublated.

According to this its determinateness over against the infinite, the finite is negation as the determinateness on existence; it is not the negation of negation, but the first negation, or the one that has indeed sublated being within itself yet keeps it stored up within itself, merely the immediate negation. The finite therefore, as real existence, stands over against the infinite as its negation. Both stand only in reference to each other; the finite is not yet truly sublated but remains standing over against the infinite; immediately the infinite has likewise not truly sublated the finite within itself but has it outside itself.

The infinite posited in this way is the bad infinite, or the infinite of the understanding. It is not the negation of negation but is brought down to the simple first negation. It is the nothing of the finite, which is the real; it is the empty, determinationless beyond of existence. — In this way it is indeed the determination of the finite to become infinite, but the finite does not have this its determination on its own self; its being-in-itself is not in its existence but a beyond of it.

This infinite is the same empty abstraction that at the beginning stood over against being as nothing. There it was the immediate nothing; here it is the nothing that comes back and emerges out of existence, and that stands in reference to existence as merely immediate negation. Because the finite thus remains over against it as existence, the infinite has its limit on the finite and is thus only a determinate, self-finite infinite.

Thus to representation the finite appears as the actual, and the infinite by contrast as the unactual, which in a dim, unreachable distance is supposed to be the in-itself of the finite yet at the same time only its limit; for the two are outside and beyond one another.

They are outside one another, yet by their nature absolutely referred to each other; each is the limit of the other and consists only in having this limit. In their separation each therefore has at the same time this its other on its own self, but as the non-being of itself, repelling it from itself just as immediately. Their unity is thus not the reference posited on them; that reference is rather their reference as absolute others, of finitude as reality, of infinity as negation. — Their unity of concept is the determination, in which the ought and the restriction were the same, and out of which finitude and infinity have sprung. But this unity has hidden itself in the otherness of the two; it is the inward one, which merely lies at the ground; — hence the infinite seems merely to come forth on the finite, and the finite on the infinite, the one other on the other, that is to say, each seems to be a coming-to-be of its own, an immediate coming-to-be, and their reference merely an external one.

One therefore goes out beyond the finite into the infinite. This going-beyond appears as an external doing. In this void what comes to be? What is the positive in it? For the sake of the unity of the infinite and the finite, or because this infinite is itself limited, the limit comes to be; the infinite sublates itself again, its other, the finite, has entered. But this entering of the finite appears as a doing external to the infinite, and the new limit as something that does not come to be out of the infinite itself. There is thus present the relapse into the previous, sublated determination. This new limit, however, is itself only something that is to be sublated, or gone out beyond. Thus the void, the nothing, has come to be once more, in which, however, that determination, a new limit, can be posited, and so on into infinity.

There is present the reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite; the finite is finite only in the reference to the ought or to the infinite, and the infinite is infinite only in reference to the finite. They are absolute others over against each other, and each has the other of itself on its own self.

It is this reciprocal determination which appears more precisely in the quantitative sphere as the progress into infinity, which in so many shapes and applications counts as an ultimate, beyond which one goes no further; rather, having arrived at that: And so on into infinity, thought is wont to have reached its end.

The reason why this going-beyond is not itself gone beyond has emerged. Only the bad infinite is present; one does indeed go out beyond it, for a new limit is posited, but by that very act one rather only returns to the finite. Bad infinity is the same as the perennial ought; it is indeed the negation of the finite, but it is not able to free itself from the finite in truth; the finite comes forth again on infinity itself, as its other, because this infinite only is as in reference to the finite that is other to it. The progress into infinity is therefore only the self-repeating sameness, one and the same tedious alternation of this finite and this infinite.

This infinity of the infinite progress, which remains saddled with the finite, has its other, the finite, on its own self; it is thereby bounded and itself finite; it is the bad infinity for the reason that it is not in and for itself but only is as reference to its other.

This infinite is itself finite. — It would thus in fact be the unity of the finite and the infinite. But upon this unity no reflection is made. Yet it alone is what calls forth the infinite within the finite and the finite within the infinite, and is, so to speak, the mainspring of the infinite progress. The progress is the outward side of that unity, at which representation comes to a halt, at that perennial repetition of one and the same alternating, at the empty restlessness of moving on out beyond the limit, a moving-on that finds a new limit in this infinite yet can hold itself on that limit as little as it can within the infinite. This infinite has, on the one hand, the fixed determination of a beyond, which therefore cannot be reached, and that because it is not supposed to be reached, because it has the determination of a beyond. According to this determination it has the finite over against it, as the determination of a this-side; a finite which can just as little raise itself into the infinite, and that because it has this determination of an other for it.

3. Return of Infinity into Itself

In fact, however, the truth of this infinite is already contained in this reciprocal determining that passes over and back. For it is, as was recalled, itself finite, being absolutely referred to the finite. The unity of the finite and the infinite is therefore not merely the inner, but is itself present. The infinite is only as the going-beyond of the finite; the finite likewise only as that which is a limit and beyond which one must go. In each of them, therefore, lies that determination which in the supposing of the infinite progress or of the ought is merely shut out from it and stands over against it.

But the unity of the finite and the infinite sublates them; for finite and infinite is precisely what they are only in their separation. Each, however, is on its own self this unity and this sublating of itself. Finitude is only as a going out beyond itself; contained in it, therefore, is infinity, the other of itself. Just so, infinity is only as a going out beyond the finite; it has meaning only as the negative reference to the finite, it therefore essentially contains its other, and is thus on itself the other of itself. The finite is not sublated by the infinite as by something that is outside it; rather its infinity consists in sublating itself. — Further, this sublating is not otherness in general; rather the finite, according to its determination, as what it is supposed to be in itself, is negation, is otherness, is existence as a non-being. Since it thus has the otherness of its determination on its own self, it is itself the otherness of otherness. — Thus infinity does not consist in the empty beyond, which is bounded only externally and receives a determination; rather infinity is likewise on itself the other of itself, which calls itself back out of its flight, and thus, as other of the empty otherness, as negation of negation, is return to itself and reference to itself.

Neither the finite as such nor the infinite as such therefore has truth. Each is on its own self the opposite of itself, and unity with its other. Their determinateness over against each other has therefore vanished. With this there has entered true in finity, in which both finitude and bad infinity are sublated. It consists in the going out beyond otherness, as the return to itself; it is negation as referring itself to itself; otherness insofar as it is not immediate otherness but the sublating of otherness, the restored equality with itself.

Existence is at first determinate being, essentially referred to an other. Non-being is in existence as being; and existence has now made itself into this on its own self, namely as infinity. The determinateness of existence has vanished as reference to an other; it has become determinateness referring itself to itself, absolute, restrictionless being-determined. This pure being-determined within itself, not through an other, qualitative infinity, being that is equal to itself, as the negative reference to itself, is being-for-itself.

Remark

The infinite, — in the ordinary sense of bad infinity, — and the progress into infinity, like the ought, are the expression of a contradiction that takes itself for the resolution, or for what is ultimate. This infinite is a first elevation of sensuous representing above the finite into thought, a thought that however has only the content of nothing, — a flight beyond what is limited, a flight that fails to collect itself inward and cannot carry the negative back into the positive. This incomplete reflection places negativity in the beyond, while the positive or the real stays on this side. Although the elevation of the finite into the infinite and the calling back of the beyond into this side, or the sublating of these two imperfect determinations, is present, reflection nevertheless does not bring these two thoughts together. The nature of speculative thinking consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity. Since each of them shows in itself that it has its opposite on its own self, its positive truth is this unity, the taking together of both thoughts, their infinity, the reference to itself, not the immediate reference but the infinite one.

The essence of philosophy has often been placed, by those who are already more familiar with thinking, in the task of answering how the infinite comes out of itself and to finitude? — The infinite at whose concept we have arrived will determine itself further in the course of this exposition, and will thereby show on itself what is demanded, namely how it, if one wishes to express it so, comes to finitude. Here we consider this question only in its immediacy, and with regard to the sense considered just now which the infinite is wont to have.

On the answering of this question it is supposed to depend whether there is a philosophy at all, and while one gives out that one is willing to let the matter turn on this, one believes at the same time to possess in the question itself an invincible talisman by which one is made firm and secure against the answer and thereby against philosophy in general. — With other subject matters too it presupposes a formation to understand how to ask, but still more with philosophical subject matters, if one is to receive an answer other than that the question is worthless.

With such questions it is customary, in respect of the expression, to lay claim to the fairness that the words do not matter, but that in one or another manner of expression what does matter is intelligible? Expressions of sensuous representation, like going out and the like, which are readily used in the question, arouse the suspicion that the home from which the question stems is the soil of ordinary representing, and that for the answer, too, representations current in common life and the shape of a sensuous simile are expected.

If instead of the infinite being in general is taken, then the determining of being, a negation on it, seems more easily comprehensible. For being is indeed itself the indeterminate; insofar therefore as it is determined, it is the determinate indeterminate, unity of determinateness and indeterminateness. But it is not immediately expressed on being that it is the opposite of what is determinate. The infinite by contrast contains this expressed; it is the not-finite. The unity of the finite and the infinite thus seems immediately shut out; incomplete, representing reflection is therefore most stubborn against this unity.

But it has been shown, and it is immediately evident, that the infinite, and indeed in the sense in which it is taken by that reflecting, — namely as standing over against the finite, — has its other on the finite for the very reason that it stands over against the finite, and is therefore bounded and itself finite. The answer to the question how the infinite becomes finite is accordingly this, that there is no infinite which is at first infinite and which would need only afterwards to become finite, to come to finitude; rather it is already for its own self just as much finite as infinite. Or since the question assumes the infinite on the one side for itself, and assumes that the finite, which has gone out of it into separation, is, in its severance from it, genuinely real, or that if not precisely this finite then at least that infinite is the truth, — one could say that this separation is indeed incomprehensible. For neither such a finite nor such an infinite has truth; but the untrue is incomprehensible. One can therefore say that this question sets up an untrue content and contains an untrue reference of that content. It is thus not to be answered; rather the false presuppositions that it contains, or the question itself, are to be negated. But what was already noted above concerning the unity of being and nothing is to be recalled, namely that the expression: unity of the infinite and the finite, or: that finite and infinite are the same, also has a lopsided side, because it expresses as motionless being what is a becoming. Thus the infinite too is the becoming towards the finite, and conversely the finite the becoming towards the infinite. One can say in this way that the infinite goes out to the finite, and indeed for the reason that it has no truth, no subsistence on its own self; so conversely the finite goes into the infinite, on the same ground of its nullity. But the question assumes the infinite that stands over against the finite as something genuine; or else the reference-less infinite, which however ought then to be called not infinite but being; yet with being it has already shown itself that this pure immediate unity has no truth.

Chapter 3. Being-for-itself

In being-for-itself the qualitative being is completed; it is infinite being. The being of the beginning is without any determination. Existence is sublated being, but only immediately sublated being. It therefore contains at first only the first, immediate negation; being is likewise present as preserved, and determinateness is as yet only limit. The movement of existence consists in shifting this limit out of its externality and into itself. In being-for-itself this reversal is completed. The negative as being-within-itself and the negative as limit, as otherness, are posited as identical; being-for-itself is the negative that refers itself to itself, absolute being-determined.

Now just as existence determines or makes itself into the existent, so first being-for-itself determines itself into that which is for itself, or into the one.

Second, the one is repulsion and passes over into a plurality of ones.

Third, however, this otherness of the one sublates itself through attraction, and quality, which in being-for-itself drove itself to its extreme point, passes over into quantity.