With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?

From the Phenomenology of Spirit, or the science of consciousness as spirit in its appearing, it is presupposed that pure knowledge issues as consciousness's last, absolute truth. Logic is pure science, pure knowledge in its whole compass and its spread. Pure knowledge is certainty that has become truth, or the certainty that no longer stands over against the object but has made it inward, knows it as its own self, and that on the other side has likewise surrendered the knowing of itself as of something standing over against the objective and being merely the annihilation thereof, has divested itself, and is unity with its own divestment.

Pure knowledge, having collapsed together into this unity, has sublated every reference to an other and mediation as well, and is simple immediacy.

Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection, and refers to the difference from what is mediated. In its true expression this simple immediacy is pure being, or being at large; being, nothing else, without any further determination and filling.

This backward glance at the concept of pure knowledge is the ground from which being comes forth in order to constitute the beginning of absolute science.

Or secondly, conversely, the beginning of absolute science must itself be an absolute beginning; it may presuppose nothing. It must therefore be mediated by nothing, nor have a ground; rather it is itself to be the ground of the whole science. It must accordingly be simply an immediate, or rather the immediate itself. Just as it can have no determination over against anything else, so too it can contain none within itself, no content, for anything of that kind would likewise be a distinguishing, and a reference of diverse terms to one another, hence a mediation. The beginning, then, is pure being.

Chiefly in more recent times has it been regarded as a difficulty to find a beginning in philosophy, and the ground of this difficulty, along with the possibility of resolving it, has been discussed in manifold ways. Philosophy's beginning has to be a mediated one or else an immediate one, and there is little trouble in showing that neither of these is open to it; with that, whichever of the two manners of beginning one adopts runs into its refutation.

In the first presentation just given of being as the beginning, the concept of knowledge is presupposed. This beginning is thus not absolute, but comes out of the preceding movement of consciousness. The science of this movement, from which knowledge results, would now have to have the absolute beginning. It makes that beginning with immediate consciousness, with the knowledge that something is. — Being thus makes the beginning here as well, but as the determination of a concrete shape, of consciousness; only pure knowledge, the spirit that has freed itself from its appearance as consciousness, has free, pure being for its beginning too. — But that beginning, immediate consciousness, contains the I as referred to a sheer other, and conversely the object as referred to the I; hence a mediation. — Consciousness does indeed contain the two mediating terms — which are in turn the mediated ones — itself, points therefore not beyond itself, and is enclosed within itself. But since the mediation is reciprocal, each mediating term is also mediated, so that no genuine immediacy is at hand. — But conversely, were such an immediacy at hand, then, not being grounded, it is something arbitrary and contingent.

The insight that what is absolutely true has to be a result, and conversely that any result has for its presupposition a first truth which, however, precisely as first, is on the objective view not necessary and on the subjective side not cognized, — has in more recent times brought forth the thought that philosophy can begin only with a hypothetical and problematic truth, and that philosophizing can therefore at first be nothing but a searching.

On this view, striding forward in philosophy is rather a going backwards and a grounding, through which alone it emerges that what was begun with is not merely something arbitrarily assumed but is in fact partly the true, partly the first truth.

One must concede that it is an essential consideration — one that will emerge more closely within logic itself — that going forward is a return into the ground and to the original, upon which what the beginning was made with depends. — Consciousness is in this way led back, on its road from the immediacy with which it starts, to absolute knowledge as its truth. This last term, the ground, is then also that out of which the first proceeds, the first that came on the scene at the outset as an immediate. — In this way, too, spirit will at the end of the development of pure knowledge divest itself with freedom and release itself into the shape of an immediate consciousness, as the consciousness of a being that stands over against it as an other. What is essential is properly not that a purely immediate be the beginning, but that the whole is a circuit within itself, wherein the first also becomes the last and the last also the first.

Hence it is on the other side just as necessary to regard that into which the movement goes back, as into its ground, as a result. In this respect the first is quite as much the ground, and the last is something derived. For since one sets out from the first and arrives by correct inferences at the last, as at the ground, this last is in fact a result. The advance from what makes the beginning is furthermore only a further determination of it, so that this remains lying at the base of all that follows and does not vanish out of it. The advancing does not consist in an other being derived, or in a transition being made into a genuine other; — and insofar as such passing over does occur, it just as much sublates itself again. Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation present and preserving itself throughout all subsequent developments, the concept altogether immanent in its further determinations.

Through this advance, in which the beginning determines itself further, it loses whatever one-sidedness it has in the determinateness of being an immediate, becomes something mediated, and by that very fact turns the line of scientific forward movement into a circle. — At the same time, what makes the beginning, being therein still the undeveloped and contentless, is not yet truly cognized, for such is it at the beginning, that is, still before the science; only the science, and indeed in its entire development, is the completed, content-filled and first truly grounded cognition of it.

But just because the result also constitutes the absolute ground, the progression of this cognition is not something provisional, nor something problematic and hypothetical; it is determined rather by the nature of the matter and of the content itself. Nor is that beginning something arbitrary and merely assumed for the time being, nor something that appears arbitrary and is presupposed as a request, but of which it nevertheless showed in the sequel that one had done right in making it the beginning; — as with geometrical constructions it admittedly emerges only afterwards in the proofs, that one did well to draw just these lines, or even in the proofs themselves, that it was good to begin with the comparison of these lines or angles; taken for itself, in this drawing of lines or comparing, it is not comprehended.

Thus the ground why in pure science the start is made from pure being has been stated above immediately on that science itself. This pure being is the unity into which pure knowledge goes back, or it is also the content of that knowledge. This is the side on which this pure being, this absolutely immediate, is just as much something absolutely mediated. But it is just as essentially the purely immediate; only as such is it therefore to be taken, precisely because it is the beginning; insofar as it were not this pure indeterminateness, insofar as it were further determined, it would be taken as something mediated. It lies in the nature of the beginning itself that it be being, and nothing else. No other preparations are therefore needed in order to get into philosophy, nor further reflections and points of attachment.

From the fact that the beginning is the beginning of philosophy, no closer determination or positive content can now be drawn for it. For philosophy is here at the beginning, where the matter itself is not yet at hand, an empty word, or some assumed, unjustified representation. Pure knowledge gives only this negative determination, that the beginning is to be the abstract, or absolute, beginning. Insofar as pure being is taken as the content of pure knowledge, this knowledge has to step back from its content, to let it have its own way and not determine it further. — Or since pure being must be regarded as the unity into which knowledge, at its highest peak of union with the object, has collapsed, knowledge has vanished into this unity and has left over no difference from it and hence no determination for it.

Nor is there otherwise any something, or any content, at hand that could be used to make the more determinate beginning with. There is nothing at hand but pure being as beginning. In this determination, as beginning, pure immediacy is something more concrete, and what is immediately contained in it can be developed analytically, in order to see where this leads further.

In general the determination of being, hitherto assumed as the beginning, can also be left out entirely; all that is demanded is that a pure beginning be made; nothing is thus at hand but the beginning itself, and it remains to see what it is.

As yet there is nothing, and something is to become. The beginning is not the pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; being too is at the same time already contained in it. Both are held in the beginning, then, being and nothing; the beginning is their unity; — or it is non-being which is at once being, and being which is at once non-being.

Being and nothing are present in the beginning as distinguished; for the beginning gestures beyond itself to something else; — it is a non-being referred to being as to an other; whatever begins is not yet; it is only making its way toward being. At the same time the beginning holds being within it, yet as a being that withdraws from non-being, or sublates non-being as its opposite.

Further, however, what begins already is, yet just as much it also is not yet. Being and non-being are therefore in it in immediate union; or the beginning is their undifferentiated unity.

Analysing the beginning would accordingly furnish the concept of a unity of being with non-being, — or in more reflected form, of a unity of being-distinguished with being-not-distinguished, — or of the identity of identity and non-identity. One might take this concept for the first and purest definition of the absolute; — as indeed it would be, if the form of definitions and the name of the absolute were at issue at all. On this reckoning, with that abstract concept as the first, every subsequent determination and development would amount to nothing but a richer, more determinate definition of the absolute.

Yet this analysis of the beginning presupposes the beginning as familiar; it has our representation of it for its basis. This is an instance of how other sciences proceed. They presuppose their subject matter as familiar, and assume in doing so, as a request, that everyone may find in his representation of it roughly the same determinations that they, by analysis, comparison and other reasoning, gather up from here and there and state about it. What makes the absolute beginning must indeed be something familiar; but if it is something concrete, hence determined within itself in manifold ways, then, in presupposing these its references as something familiar, I give them out as something immediate which they are not. With them, accordingly, the contingency and arbitrariness of analysis and of the various ways of determining sets in. Because the reference has once been conceded as something immediately given, everyone has the right to bring in or leave out the determinations according to what he finds in his immediate, contingent representation.

But insofar as the subject matter, as analysis presupposes it, is something concrete, a synthetic unity, the reference contained in it is a necessary one only insofar as it is not found ready to hand but is brought forth by the moments' own movement of going back into this unity; — a movement that is the opposite of the one mentioned, which is an analytic procedure, and a doing external to the matter itself and falling within the subject.

From this there emerges more closely what was remarked earlier, that what the beginning is to be made with cannot be something concrete, cannot be such as contains a reference within its own self, for such a thing presupposes a movement, a mediating and a crossing over from one term to another within itself, of which the concrete that has become simple would be the result. But the beginning is not to be a result. What makes the beginning, the beginning itself, is therefore to be taken as something non-analysable, in its simple, unfilled immediacy, hence as being, as the wholly empty.

If someone, impatient perhaps with the consideration of the abstract beginning, wanted to say that one should begin not with the beginning but with the matter, then this matter is nothing but that empty being; for what the matter may be is precisely what is to emerge only in the course of the science, what cannot be presupposed as familiar before it.

Whatever other form may be adopted so as to have a beginning other than empty being, such a beginning suffers from the defects adduced. Insofar as one reflects that from the first truth everything that follows must be derived, that the first truth must be the ground of the whole, the demand seems necessary to make the beginning with God, with the absolute, and to comprehend everything out of him. If, instead of laying the representation at the base in the usual way and sending ahead a definition of the absolute conforming to it, — which was spoken of earlier, — the closer determination of this absolute is on the contrary taken from immediate self-consciousness, if it is determined as I, then this is indeed partly an immediate, partly something familiar in a far higher sense than any other representation; for something otherwise familiar does belong to the I, but since it is only a representation, it is still a content distinguished from the I; the I, by contrast, is the simple certainty of itself. But this certainty is at the same time something concrete, or rather the I is what is most concrete; it is the consciousness of itself as an infinitely manifold world. For the I to be the beginning and ground of philosophy, however, the setting apart of the concrete is required, — the absolute act by which the I is purified of itself and enters as absolute I into its consciousness. But this pure I is then not the familiar, ordinary I of our consciousness, to which the science was to be attached immediately and for everyone. That act would properly be nothing other than the elevation to the standpoint of pure knowledge, on which the difference of the subjective and the objective has precisely vanished. But since this elevation is demanded thus immediately, it is a subjective postulate; to prove itself a genuine demand, the advance of the concrete I, or of immediate consciousness, to pure knowledge would have to have been exhibited and set forth on that I, out of a necessity belonging to it. Without such objective movement pure knowledge, the intellectual intuition, shows up as a standpoint adopted at will, or indeed as merely one among the empirical states of consciousness, where all hangs on whether the one person finds it in himself or can produce it, while another cannot. But insofar as this pure I must be essential pure knowledge, while pure knowledge is posited in individual consciousness only through the absolute act of self-elevation and is not immediately at hand in it, precisely that advantage is lost which is supposed to spring from this beginning of philosophy; namely that it is something simply familiar, which everyone finds immediately within himself and to which further reflection could attach itself; that pure I is rather, in its absolute essentiality, something unknown to ordinary consciousness, something that consciousness does not find within itself. There enters accordingly the deception rather that the talk is supposed to be of something familiar, of the I of empirical self-consciousness, whereas in fact the talk is of something remote from this consciousness. The determination of pure knowledge as I carries with it the continuing recollection of the subjective I, whose restrictions are supposed to be forgotten, and keeps present the representation that the propositions and relations which emerge in the further development from the I occur in ordinary consciousness as something at hand within it — since it is surely that of which they are asserted — and can be found within it. This confusion produces, instead of immediate clarity, only an all the more glaring bewilderment and complete disorientation.

Pure knowledge takes from the I its restricted meaning of having its insuperable opposite in an object; for this reason it would be at the very least superfluous to retain this subjective posture and the determination of pure essence as I any further. But this determination not only carries that disturbing ambiguity with it; considered more closely, it also remains an I that is still subjective. The actual development of the science that sets out from the I shows that within it the object has and keeps the perennial determination of an other for the I, and hence that the I one sets out from is not pure knowledge, which has truly overcome the opposition of consciousness, and is thus still within appearance and not the element of being-in-and-for-itself.

But even if the I were in fact pure knowledge, or if intellectual intuition were in fact the beginning, what matters in science is not what is inwardly at hand, but the existence of the inward within knowledge. But whatever of intellectual intuition — or, should its object be called the eternal, the divine, the absolute, — whatever of the eternal or the absolute is there at the beginning of the science, this is nothing other than a first, immediate, simple determination. Whatever richer name be set over against it than mere being expresses, the only thing that can come into consideration is how it enters into knowledge and into the uttering of knowledge. Intellectual intuition is itself the forcible rejection of mediating and of demonstrative, external reflection; but whatever it utters over and above simple immediacy is something concrete, something containing diverse determinations within itself. The uttering and the exposition of such a concrete, however, is a mediating movement that begins from one of the determinations and advances to the other, even if it goes back again to the first; — it is a movement that may at the same time not be arbitrary or assertoric. Hence what is begun from in this exposition is not the concrete itself, but only a simple immediate out of which the movement proceeds.

If then in the expression of the absolute or the eternal or God, if in the intuition or thought of these there lies more than in pure being, then what lies therein is to step forth into knowledge; let what lies therein be as rich as it may, still the determination that steps first into knowledge is something simple; for only in the simple is there no more than the pure beginning; or that determination is only the immediate, for only in the immediate is there not yet a having-advanced from one term to another, hence likewise no more than the beginning. Whatever the richer forms of the absolute or of God are meant to utter or to hold over and above being amounts, at the beginning, to a mere empty word and to being alone; and this simple thing, which carries no meaning beyond that, this emptiness, is thus where philosophy absolutely begins.

So simple is this insight in itself that the beginning, as was recalled, needs neither preparation nor further introduction; and these preliminary ruminations upon it could have had no aim of leading up to it, but rather of clearing preliminariness of every kind out of the way.

General Division of Being

Being is first determined over against an other;

Secondly, it is determined within its own self;

Thirdly, it returns out of the determining into itself, throws away this preliminariness of dividing, and restores itself to the indeterminateness and immediacy wherein it is able to be a beginning.

In its first determination being separates itself off over against essence, as was indicated already.

This division is here, as was recalled in the Introduction about such divisions generally, a preliminary citation; its determinations have first to arise out of the movement of being itself, and to justify themselves therein. About its divergence from the usual enumeration of the categories — quantity, quality, relation and modality, that is — nothing further need be recalled here, since the whole exposition will display what diverges at large from the usual order and meaning of the categories.

Only this much can be remarked more closely, that elsewhere the determination of quantity is listed before quality, — and this — like most such things — without further ground. It has been shown already that the start is taken with being as such, and hence with qualitative being. From the comparison of quality with quantity it readily appears that quality is by nature the first; for quantity is only quality that has become negative. Magnitude is that determinateness which is no longer at one with being but already differentiated from it, quality sublated and turned indifferent. It carries within it the alterability of being, without the matter itself — the being whose determination it is — being altered thereby; whereas the qualitative determinateness is one with its being, does not go out beyond it nor stand within it, but is its immediate limitedness. Quality is therefore, as the immediate determinateness, the first, and the beginning is to be made with it.

Measure is a relation, but not relation at large, rather the determinate relation of quality and quantity to one another. It can also count as a modality, should one wish; since modality is meant to make up no determination of content any longer, but to bear merely on content's reference to thinking, to the subjective. Measure contains the dissolution of the content, its reference to an other; it constitutes the transition into essence.

The third division falls within the section on quality.

First Section. Determinateness

(Quality.)

Being is the immediate that is indeterminate; it stands free of the first determinateness over against essence, and free of the second within its own self. Such being, void of reflection, is what being immediately is in and for itself.

Being indeterminate, it is being without quality; but the character of indeterminateness falls to it only in contrast with what is determinate or qualitative. Determinate being as such therefore confronts being at large; or, with that, its very indeterminateness makes up its quality. It will therefore show itself that the first being, determinate in itself, thus

Secondly is existence, or that it passes over into existence; but that this, as finite being, sublates itself, and into the infinite reference of being to its own self,

Thirdly, into being-for-itself, passes over.

Chapter 1. Being

A. Being

Being, pure being, — without any further determination. Within its indeterminate immediacy it is nothing but self-same, and neither is it unlike an other; it holds no diversity inside itself, nor any facing outward. Should some determination or content be distinguished within it, or should it through such content be posited as distinguished from an other, it would then not be maintained in its purity. It is indeterminateness and emptiness in their purity. — In it there is nothing to intuit, supposing intuiting may be spoken of at this point; or else it is just this pure, empty intuiting itself. There is just as little anything in it to be thought, or it is, in the same way, only this empty thinking. In truth being, the indeterminate immediate, is nothing, and no more and no less than nothing.

B. Nothing

Nothing, the pure nothing; it is simple sameness with itself, an utter emptiness, lack of determination and lack of content; undifferentiatedness inside it. — To the extent that intuiting or thinking may be brought up at this point, whether something or nothing is what gets intuited or thought is taken to make a difference. Intuiting or thinking nothing has a significance, then; nothing is present in our intuiting or thinking; or, better, it is that empty intuiting and thinking itself; and it is the same empty intuiting or thinking as pure being is. — So nothing carries the same determination, or rather the same want of determination, and with that it is out and out the same as what pure being is.

C. Becoming

Unity of Being and Nothing

The pure being and the pure nothing are the same. What the truth is, is neither the being nor the nothing, but rather that the being into nothing, and the nothing into being, — is not passing over, — but has passed over. Yet the truth is equally not their undifferentiatedness; it lies rather in this, that they are absolutely distinguished, while each of them, with the same immediacy, disappears in its opposite. Their truth, then, is this movement in which the one immediately disappears in the other; becoming; a movement wherein both stand distinguished, though through a difference that has dissolved itself just as immediately.

Remark 1

Nothing is what one habitually sets over against something; something, however, is a determinate being, one that marks itself off from other somethings; and so the nothing set over against something, the nothing of some something or other, is a determinate nothing as well. The nothing that must be taken here, however, is the nothing in its indeterminate simplicity; the nothing purely in and for itself. — Non-being contains the reference to being; it is therefore not the pure nothing, but the nothing as it already is within becoming.

The simple thought of pure being was pronounced first by Parmenides, as the absolute and as the sole truth, and in the fragments left to us from him, with the pure exaltation of a thinking that lays hold of itself for the first time in its absolute abstraction: being alone is, and the nothing is not at all. — The profound Heraclitus, in opposition to that simple and one-sided abstraction, held up the higher, total concept of becoming, and said: being is just as little as the nothing is, or again that all things flow, that is, that all is becoming. — The popular sayings, oriental ones especially, that whatever is has within its very birth the germ of its own ceasing-to-be, and that death is inversely the doorway into fresh life, give voice at bottom to this same uniting of being and nothing. Yet these expressions carry a substratum on which the transition takes place; in time being and nothing are held apart from one another, represented as alternating within it, rather than thought in their abstraction, and hence not thought in such a way that in and for themselves they are the same.

Ex nihilo nihil fit — this is one of those propositions to which the metaphysics of former times ascribed great significance. But what is to be seen in it is either only the empty tautology: nothing is nothing; or else, if becoming were supposed to have any real significance there, then, seeing that out of nothing only nothing comes to be, no becoming is in fact at hand in it, for nothing stays nothing. What becoming contains is that nothing shall not stay nothing, but shall pass over into its other, into being. — When the later metaphysics, the Christian above all, threw out the proposition that out of nothing nothing comes, it thereby asserted a transition of nothing into being; however synthetically, or however merely representationally, it took this proposition, even the most imperfect union still holds within it a point at which being and nothing come together and their distinctness vanishes.

If the result, that being and nothing are the same, strikes one as odd or looks paradoxical, no further heed need be paid to it; what deserves astonishment is rather that astonishment itself, which shows itself as something so new in philosophy and forgets that views of a wholly different kind occur in this science than occur in ordinary consciousness and in so-called common human understanding. It would be no hard matter to exhibit this unity of being and nothing in any example one likes, in anything actual or in any thought. But such an empirical elucidation would at the same time be wholly and utterly superfluous. Since this unity now lies at the ground of everything once and for all, and makes up the element of all that follows, becoming itself apart, all further logical determinations — existence, quality, indeed every concept of philosophy — are examples of this unity.

The confusion into which ordinary consciousness throws itself in the face of such a logical proposition has its ground in this, that it brings along with it representations of some concrete something, and loses sight of the fact that nothing of that sort is under discussion, but rather the pure abstractions alone, those of being and of nothing, and that these are what have to be held fast in and for themselves.

Being and non-being are the same; therefore it makes no odds whether I am or fail to be, whether this house stands or does not, whether these hundred thalers belong to my financial estate or not. — This inference, or this application of that proposition, alters its sense completely. What the proposition contains are the pure abstractions of being and nothing; the application, though, turns these into a determinate being and a determinate nothing. But determinate being, as was said, is not what is under discussion here. A determinate being, a finite one, is a being that bears reference to an other; it is a content that stands with other content, with the world entire, in a relation of necessity. With regard to the reciprocally determining interconnection of the whole, metaphysics was able to make the — at bottom tautological — claim that if a single mote of dust were absolutely destroyed, the whole universe would collapse. But take from the determinate content its interconnection with other things, and represent it in isolation, then its necessity is sublated, and it makes no odds whether this isolated thing, this isolated human being, exists or not. Or again, when this whole interconnection is drawn together into one, the determinate existence that refers itself to an other likewise vanishes, for the universe has no further other, and it is no difference whether it is or is not.

Something appears, then, as not indifferent to whether it be or not be, yet not for the sake of the being or the non-being, but for the sake of its determinateness, of its content, which links it up with other things. If the sphere of being is presupposed, and within it a determinate content, some determinate existence or other, is assumed, then this existence, because it is determinate, stands in manifold reference to other content; and for it it is by no means indifferent whether some certain other content with which it stands in reference is or is not; for only by way of such reference is it essentially what it is. The same holds in the case of representing (when we take non-being in the more determinate sense of representing as against actuality), in whose interconnection the being or the absence of a content that stands determinately in reference to another is not indifferent. — For in general the real difference first begins only with determinateness: indeterminate being and nothing do not yet have it upon them, but only the difference that is merely supposed.

This consideration contains the same as what makes up a main moment in the Kantian critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God; more closely, though, that critique is to be considered only at the opposition of concept and concrete existence. — As is well known, in this so-called proof the concept of a being was presupposed to which all realities accrue, hence concrete existence too, which was likewise assumed to be one of the realities. The Kantian critique fastened above all on this, that concrete existence is no property and no real predicate, which is to say, not a concept of anything that could accrue to the concept of a thing. — Kant means by this to say that being is no determination of content. — Hence, he goes on, the possible contains no more than the actual; a hundred actual thalers contain not the least bit more than a hundred possible ones; — namely, the former have no other determination of content than the latter. For this content considered as isolated it is indifferent to be or not to be; there lies in it no difference of being or non-being, this difference does not touch it at all; the hundred thalers do not become fewer if they are not, and not [m]ore if they are. The difference must first come from […]elsewhere. — “On the other hand, Kant recalls, in my financial estate there is more with a hundred actual thalers than with the mere concept of them, or with their possibility. For where actuality is concerned the object is not merely contained analytically within my concept, but accrues to my concept, (that concept being a determination of my state,) synthetically, without these hundred thalers as thought being in the least augmented by this being outside my concept.”

Two sorts of states are here presupposed, to keep to the Kantian expressions, the pure one, which Kant calls the concept, by which representation is to be understood, and another, the financial estate. For the one as for the other a hundred thalers are a further determination of content, or they accrue, as Kant expresses it, synthetically; and I as possessor of a hundred thalers, or as non-possessor of them, or again I as representing a hundred thalers to myself or not representing them, is a different content. On the one hand it makes a difference whether I merely represent these hundred thalers to myself or possess them, whether they are therefore to be found in the one state or in the other, because I have once and for all presupposed these two states as different determinations. On the other hand, taking each of these states by itself, within it they are a particular determination of content, one that enters into reference to something else, and whose vanishing is not a mere non-being but makes up an otherness. It is a deception that we push the difference off merely onto being and non-being, onto whether I have the hundred thalers or do not have them. This deception rests upon the one-sided abstraction which drops the determinate existence that is always at hand in such examples and clings merely to being and non-being. As was recalled just now, it is existence that first is the real difference of being and nothing, a something and an other. — It is this real difference, that of something and an other, which hovers before representation, in place of pure being and pure nothing.

As Kant puts it, through concrete existence something enters the context of experience as a whole; we get by this one more object of perception, yet our concept of the object gains nothing thereby. — This means, as follows from what has been elucidated, in fact this much: through concrete existence, essentially because something is determinate concrete existence, it enters into interconnection with an other, or stands within it, and among other things with something perceiving. — The concept of the hundred thalers, says Kant, is not augmented by perceiving. — The concept here means the hundred thalers as represented in isolation, outside the context of experience and of perceiving. In this isolated fashion they are indeed a determination of content, and a very empirical one at that, but a severed one, without interconnection and without determinateness over against an other; the form of identity with self, of the simple determinateness that refers only to itself, lifts them above the reference to an other and leaves them indifferent as to whether they be perceived or not. But if they are genuinely considered as determinate and as referred to an other, and the form of simple self-reference, which does not belong to such a determinate content, is taken from them, then they are no longer indifferent to existence and non-existence, but have entered the sphere in which the difference of being and non-being holds, not indeed as such, but as the difference of something and an other.

The thinking, or rather the representing, before which only a determinate being, or existence, hovers, into which the real diversity of being and nothing falls, is to be referred back to that beginning of pure science which Parmenides made, who among human beings appears to have been the first to purify and raise his representing, and with it the representing of the time that followed, into the pure thought of being, and thereby to have created the element of science.

But it must be recalled, to return to the main matter, that the expression of the result which issues from the consideration of being and of nothing, through the proposition: being and nothing are one and the same, is imperfect. For the accent is laid preferentially on their being one and the same, and the sense therefore seems to be that the difference is denied, which nevertheless occurs immediately in the proposition itself at the same time; for the proposition enunciates the two determinations, being and nothing, and holds them within it as distinguished. — Nor can it be meant, at the same time, that one should abstract from them and cling only to the unity. Such a sense would give itself out as one-sided, since what is to be abstracted from is nonetheless present in the proposition. — Insofar as the proposition: being and nothing are the same, enunciates the identity of these determinations, but in fact contains them equally as distinguished, it contradicts itself in itself and dissolves. A proposition is therefore posited here which, more closely considered, has the movement of vanishing through itself. With that there happens to it just what is supposed to make up its proper content, namely becoming.

The proposition accordingly contains the result, it is in itself the result itself; but the result is not expressed in it in its truth; it is an external reflection that recognizes the result in it. — The proposition, in the form of a judgment, is in general not immediately suited to express speculative truths. The judgment is an identical reference between subject and predicate; even if the subject has still more determinatenesses than that of the predicate, and to that extent is something other than the predicate, these accrue only as added on, and do not sublate the identical reference of this predicate with its subject, which remains its ground and bearer. But if the content is speculative, then the non-identical element of subject and predicate is likewise an essential moment, and the transition or the vanishing of the first into the other is their reference. That paradoxical and bizarre light in which so much of more recent philosophy shows itself to anyone not conversant with speculative thinking falls in many cases upon the form of the simple judgment, whenever that form is used for expressing speculative results.

The genuine result that has emerged here is becoming, which is not merely the abstract or one-sided unity of being and of nothing. Rather, it consists in this movement: that the pure being is immediate and simple, that for that very reason it is just as much the pure nothing, that the difference of the two is, yet just as much sublates itself and is not. The result therefore asserts the difference of being and of nothing just as much, but as a merely supposed one. — One supposes that being is rather the simply other over against what nothing is, and that nothing is more evident than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to specify it. But one may just as easily convince oneself that this is impossible. For if being and nothing possessed any determinateness whatever by which they were distinguished, then, as was recalled earlier, what they would be is a determinate being and a determinate nothing, not that pure being and pure nothing which they still are here. Their difference is therefore entirely empty, each of the two is in like manner the indeterminate; it consequently does not subsist on them themselves, but only in a third, in supposing. But supposing is a form of the subjective, which does not belong in this series of the exposition. The third, however, in which being and nothing have their subsistence, must occur here too; and it has occurred, it is becoming. In it they are as distinguished ones; becoming is only insofar as they are diverse. This third is an other than they are; — they subsist only in an other, which means equally that they do not subsist for themselves. Becoming is the subsistence of being quite as much as of non-being; or their subsistence is nothing other than their being in one; and it is precisely this subsistence of theirs that just as much sublates their difference.

One is also apt to represent being under the image, say, of light in its purity, as the clearness of undimmed seeing, but nothing as pure night, and to tie their difference to this well-known sensuous diversity. In fact, however, if one represents this seeing to oneself more precisely, it is easily grasped that one sees as much and as little in absolute clarity as in absolute darkness, that the one seeing is quite as much as the other a pure seeing, a seeing of nothing. Light in its purity and darkness in its purity are two vacuities, and these are the same. Only in determinate light — and light is determined by darkness, — hence in dimmed light, and equally only in determinate darkness, — and darkness is determined by light, — in illuminated darkness, can something be distinguished; because only dimmed light and illuminated darkness have the difference upon themselves, and are thereby determinate being, existence.

Remark 2

Parmenides held fast to being, and said of nothing that it is not at all; only being is. That through which this pure being was led onward to becoming was the reflection that it is equal to nothing. Being itself is the indeterminate; it therefore has no reference to anything else; it seems accordingly that from this beginning no further advance can be made, namely out of the beginning itself, without something alien being attached to it from outside. The reflection that being is equal to nothing thus appears as a second, absolute beginning. On the other side, being would not be the absolute beginning if it had a determinateness, for then it would depend on an other and would in truth not be a beginning. But if it is indeterminate and hence a true beginning, then it also has nothing by which it might carry itself over into an other; it is thereby at the same time the end.

That reflection, that being is not equal to itself but rather is utterly unequal to itself, is, considered from the latter side, indeed to that extent a second, new beginning, but at the same time an other beginning, by which the first is sublated. This is, as was already recalled above, the true meaning of advancing in general. In philosophy the advance from that which is a beginning is at the same time the return to its source, to its genuine beginning. Thus in going out beyond the beginning there at the same time begins a new beginning, and the first thereby shows itself as not the genuine one. This side, then, that the reflection which sets being equal to nothing is a new beginning, is conceded, and it is, as is clear, itself necessary. But conversely this new beginning is, just as much as the first, not an absolute one; for it refers to the first. For this reason, however, it must lie in the first itself that an other refers to it; it must therefore be something determinate. — But it is the immediate, that which is still utterly indeterminate. Yet precisely this indeterminateness is what constitutes its determinateness, for indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; as something opposed it is thus itself the determinate, or the negative, and indeed pure negativity. This indeterminateness or negativity which being has in it itself is what the reflection expresses when it sets being equal to nothing. — Or one may put it thus: because being is that which is without determination, it is not the determination which it is, hence not being but nothing.

In itself, then, that is, in essential reflection, the transition is not immediate; but it is still concealed. Here only its immediacy is present; because being is posited only as immediate, nothing breaks out immediately in it. — A more determinate mediation is the one from which science itself, and its beginning, pure being, has its existence. Knowledge has attained the element of pure thinking by having sublated within itself all the manifoldness of the manifoldly determined consciousness. The whole sphere of knowledge therefore contains as its essential moment absolute abstraction and negativity; being, its beginning, is this pure abstraction itself, or is essentially only as absolute nothing.

This recollection, however, lies behind science, which within itself, namely from essence onward, will exhibit that one-sided immediacy of being as something mediated.

But insofar as that breaking out of nothing, and the consideration of being as to what it is in itself, are spurned, nothing is present but pure being. One holds fast to it as it is beginning and at the same time end, and in its immediate immediacy refuses the reflection that leads it out beyond itself, namely that it is the indeterminate, the empty. Into this pure immediacy nothing seems able to break in.

Since this assertion of reflectionless being holds fast to the merely immediate, to that as which being is posited or as which it is present, one must likewise keep to it and see how this being then is present. Now because being is nothing, this must exhibit itself in its immediacy.

Let us take the assertion of pure being

α) in the form in which it has stepped forth furthest out of supposing, as the proposition: Being is the absolute; then something is asserted of being that is distinguished from it. What is distinguished from it is an other than it; but the other contains the nothing of that whose other it is. What is therefore present in this proposition is not pure being, but being just as much in reference to its nothing. — The absolute is distinguished from it; but in saying that it is the absolute, it is also said that the two are not distinguished. Thus what is present is not pure being but the movement which is becoming.

β) If now pure being means just as much as the absolute, or if it means only one side or part of the absolute and only this side is held fast, then their difference is dropped, the difference which just now clouded the purity of being, and the diversity vanishes as one merely of the word or as a connection with a useless part.

The proposition now runs: Being is being. — Of this identity, which will be spoken of below, this much is immediately clear, that like every tautology it says nothing. What is present, then, is a saying that is a not-saying; here, accordingly, the same movement, becoming, is present, only that in place of being it is a saying that runs through it.

γ) With the tautological predicate dropped, there remains the proposition: Being is. Here again being itself and the being of it are distinguished; through the is something further and hence other than being is meant to be said. But if through the is no otherness, and hence no nothing of pure being, is posited, then this is is likewise to be dropped as useless, and one is to say only: pure being.

δ) Pure being, or rather only being; propositionless, without assertion or predicate. Or the assertion has gone back into supposing. Being is by now only an exclamation which has its meaning solely in the subject. The deeper and richer this inner intuition is, if it is to comprise within itself the holy, the eternal, God and so forth, — the more does this inner thing stand off from that as which it is there, from the enunciated empty being which against that content is nothing; it has, in its meaning and its existence, the difference from itself.

Considered from the other side, this being without reference to meaning, as it immediately is and is to be immediately taken, belongs to a subject; it is something enunciated, has […] empirical existence in general, and thereby belongs to the ground of restrictions and of the negative. — Common sense, when it bristles against the unity of being and nothing and at the same time appeals to what is immediately present, will in this very experience find nothing but determinate being, being with a restriction or negation, — that very unity which it rejects. Thus the assertion of immediate being reduces itself to an empirical concrete existence whose exhibiting it cannot reject, since it is the reflectionless immediacy to which it means to hold.

The same is the case with nothing, only in the opposite way; taken in its immediacy it shows itself as that which is; for by its own nature it is the very same as being. The nothing is thought, is represented; it is spoken of; therefore it is. The nothing has its being in thinking, in representing and so forth. This being, however, is distinguished from it; it is therefore said that nothing indeed is in thinking, in representing, but that on that account it is not the case that it is, that only thinking or representing is this being. In this distinguishing, however, it is just as little to be denied that nothing stands in reference to a being; but in the reference, even though it also contains the difference, a unity of nothing with being is present.

Pure nothing is not yet the negative, the determination of reflection over against the positive; nor yet the restriction; in these determinations it immediately has the meaning of a reference to its other. Rather, nothing is here the pure absence of being, the nihil Privativum, as darkness is the absence of light. If it has now turned out that nothing is the same as being, the counter-claim is held fast that nothing has no being of its own, that it is, as was said, only absence of being, as darkness is only absence of light — a meaning which it has only in the reference to the eye, in comparison with the positive, with light. — But all this means nothing other than that the abstraction of nothing is nothing in and for itself, but only in reference to being, or, what is the same, what has turned out, that its truth is only its unity with being, — that darkness is only something in reference to light, just as conversely being is only something in reference to nothing. Even if the reference is taken superficially and externally, and one stops within it chiefly at the differentiatedness, still the unity of what is referred is essentially contained in it as a moment, and in the fact that each is only something in the reference to its other, precisely the transition of being and of nothing into existence is expressed.

Remark 3

Being is nothing, nothing is being. It has already been remarked that the expression of speculative truth through the form of simple propositions is imperfect. Here the propositions would still have to be added: Being is not nothing, nothing is not being; so that the difference too may be expressed which in those propositions is merely present. — These propositions give completely what is to be said, but not as it is to be gathered together, and is gathered together in becoming.

Into those first propositions other relations of thought can now be brought. They can be enunciated thus:

What is turns therefore into nothing, because being is the nothing.

What is not turns therefore into something, because the nothing is being.

Or immediately:

What is therefore comes to naught, because it is.

What is not therefore becomes something that is, because it is not.

The ground that anything whatever becomes something that is because it is not, and that what is vanishes because it is, appears unsatisfying already for this reason, that it is abstract and empty, whereas by the something a concrete, empirical thing is understood. True as those propositions are, still, as soon as such an existence is spoken of, the ground cannot be merely empty being or non-being or an empty reference of the two to each other, but must have the complete determinateness of the content in order to grasp that content out of it. The relation of ground in general is a further, more perfect determination of the reference of being and of non-being to each other; it cannot be applied to this reference as it stands here, because the reference is rather a unity of pure, determinationless abstractions, and so is essentially not yet a mediation.

If the relation of condition were brought in, the reference of being and non-being would yield the propositions:

Something can pass over into nothing only on the condition that it is;

and into being only on the condition that it is not.

These propositions are empty tautologies; for since a passing over into the opposite is assumed in them, it is certain that, in order for the opposite, being, to be, it is necessary that its opposite, the nothing, be. On the other hand, insofar as the connection of this transition is placed in the relation of condition, their proper unity is sublated; for the condition is indeed something necessary for the conditioned, but is not what posits it; a third must first come in, one which brings the transition about. Through the intrusion of the condition, being and nothing are thus pushed apart, and a third, falling outside them, is demanded for their reference. But becoming is such a unity of them as lies in the nature of each itself; being is in and for itself the nothing, and the nothing in and for itself being.

Remark 4

It emerges from what has gone before what the case is with the ordinary dialectic against becoming, or against beginning and going under, coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be. — Kant's antinomy over whether the world is bounded or unbounded in space and in time comes up for closer examination further on, under the concept of infinity. — That simple and customary dialectic has its basis in clinging to the opposedness of being and of nothing. The proof that no beginning, whether of the world or of a something, is possible runs as follows:

Nothing can begin, neither insofar as something is nor insofar as it is not; for insofar as it is, it is not just then beginning; but insofar as it is not, it does not begin either. — If the world or something were to have begun, it would have begun in nothing, but in nothing, or the nothing, is not a beginning; for beginning includes a being within itself, whereas the nothing contains no being. — For the same reason something also cannot cease. For then being would have to contain the nothing, but being is only being, not the opposite of itself.

Becoming, however, or beginning and ceasing, is precisely this unity of being and nothing, against which this dialectic brings forward nothing except that it assertorically denies the unity and ascribes truth to being and to nothing, each separated from the other. — To ordinary reflecting representation it counts as complete truth that being and nothing are not one; but on the other side it lets beginning and ceasing count as just as genuine determinations; yet in these it does in fact take a unity of being and nothing to be genuine.

Since the absolute severance of being from nothing is presupposed, then — as one so often hears — beginning or becoming is indeed something incomprehensible; for one makes a presupposition which sublates the beginning or the becoming that one nonetheless also concedes.

What has just been cited is the same dialectic which the understanding turns against the concept that higher analysis holds of infinitely small magnitudes. The phrase infinitely small is, for that matter, an awkward one, and the concept receives fuller treatment further on. — Magnitudes of this kind have received the determination of being ones that are in the act of vanishing, neither prior to that vanishing, since at that point they would still be finite magnitudes; — nor subsequent to it, since at that point they would be nothing at all. Against this pure concept the well-known objection has been raised, and endlessly reiterated, that magnitudes of this kind must be either a something or else nothing; that no intermediary state (state is here an inept, barbarous term) exists between being and non-being. — What underlies this too is the assumption that being and nothing stand absolutely apart. The showing has gone the other way, however: that the two coincide in fact, or, to put it in the idiom just used, that there is simply nothing which fails to be a becoming, which fails to be an intermediary state between being and nothing.

Since the reasoning adduced makes the false presupposition of the absolute separatedness of being and non-being, it is also to be called not dialectic but sophistry; for sophistry is a reasoning from a groundless presupposition which one lets count uncritically and without reflection; by dialectic, however, we mean the higher rational movement into which such utterly separate-seeming terms pass over through themselves and therein into one another. It is the dialectical nature of being and nothing themselves that they exhibit their unity, becoming, as their truth.

2. Moments of Becoming

Becoming is the unity of being and nothing; not a unity that abstracts away from the two; rather, being the unity of being and nothing, it is this determinate unity, or the one in which both being and nothing is. But inasmuch as being and nothing, each of them, is in the unity with its other, it is not. They are, then, in this unity, yet as vanishing ones, only as sublated.

They are as not being; or are moments. — To representation they present themselves at first as such that each of them, for itself, separated from the other, is self-subsistent, and they are being and nothing only in this separation. But since both are the same, they sink down from self-subsistence to moments, in that they are at first still regarded in general as distinguished but at the same time as sublated.

Inasmuch as being and nothing are in one, they are distinguished therein; but in such a way that at the same time each, in its differentiatedness, is unity with the other. Becoming therefore contains two such unities; each is unity of being and of nothing; but the one is being as reference to nothing, the other nothing as reference to being: the two determinations are of unequal worth in these unities.

Becoming is in this way in a doubled determination; as beginning from nothing, which refers itself to being, that is, passes over into it, or from being, which passes over into nothing, — coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

But these directions, differentiated in this way, permeate one another and render one another inert. The first is ceasing-to-be; being makes the transition into nothing, yet nothing is quite as much the reverse of its own self and is rather the transition into being, or coming-to-be. This coming-to-be constitutes the second direction; nothing makes the transition into being, yet being quite as much sublates its own self and is rather the transition into nothing, or ceasing-to-be.

Coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are therefore not a diverse becoming, but immediately one and the same: nor do they sublate each other reciprocally, the one externally sublating the other; rather each sublates itself in itself, and is in it itself the opposite of itself.

3. Sublation of Becoming

The equilibrium into which coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be settle themselves is at first becoming itself. But this equally collapses together into a tranquil unity. Within it, being and nothing have their standing only as vanishing ones; becoming as such, however, exists solely through the differentiatedness of the two. Their vanishing is therefore the vanishing of becoming, or a vanishing of vanishing itself. Becoming is thus an unsteady restlessness which sinks together into a tranquil result.

The point admits of this formulation as well: what becoming amounts to is being's vanishing into nothing together with nothing's vanishing into being, and altogether the vanishing of being and of nothing; yet it rests all the while upon the difference between them. It therefore contradicts itself within itself, because it unites within itself such as is opposed to itself; a union of this kind, however, destroys itself.

This result is having-vanished, not as nothing; taken so, it would be merely a relapse into one of the determinations already sublated. It is instead that unity of being and nothing which has grown into tranquil simplicity.

In becoming itself, being as well as nothing is, each in like manner rather only as the nothing of its own self. Becoming is the unity as vanishing, or the unity in the determination of nothing. But this nothing is an essential passing over into being, and becoming is therefore a passing over into the unity of being and nothing which is as something that is, or has the shape of the immediate unity of these moments; existence.

Remark

Sublating and the sublated is one of the most important concepts of philosophy, a fundamental determination which recurs absolutely everywhere, whose sense is to be grasped determinately and distinguished above all from nothing. — What sublates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is the immediate; a sublated thing, by contrast, is something mediated, it is that which is not, but as a result which has proceeded out of a being. It therefore has the determination from which it derives still in itself.

To sublate has in the language the doubled sense that it means as much as to store up, to preserve, and as much as to make cease, to put an end to. Storing up already carries the negative in it: a thing gets taken out of its immediacy, and so out of an existence lying open to outward influence, for the sake of preserving it. — What is sublated is accordingly a thing stored up as well, one that has forfeited nothing but its immediacy, and has not on that account vanished.

Take the sublated more precisely: a thing counts here as sublated only to the extent that it has stepped into the unity with what stands opposed to it; under this narrower determination it is something reflected, and the fitting name for it is moment. — As the observation will force itself upon us still more often, that the philosophical technical language uses Latin expressions for reflected determinations.

What narrower sense and expression accrue to being and to nothing, now that they have become moments, must emerge more narrowly when existence is considered, as the unity wherein the two are stored up. Only in being differentiated from one another is being being and nothing nothing; in their truth, though — in their unity — the two have vanished qua these determinations, and are by now something else. Being and nothing are the same; on the very ground of that sameness they no longer count as being and nothing, and carry a diverse determination; within becoming they stood as coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; within existence, a unity otherwise determined, they are again moments otherwise determined.

Chapter 2. Existence

Existence is determinate being. Existence itself is at the same time distinguished from its determinateness. In determinateness the concept of quality makes its entry. But determinateness passes over into constitution and alteration, and then into the opposition of the finite and the infinite, which resolves itself in being-for-itself.

A. Existence as Such

Existence as such determines itself in it itself, to the difference of the moments of being-for-other and of being-in-itself, or it determines itself, being their unity, as reality; and further into the existent or something.

1. Existence in General

Existence is the simple being-one of being and of nothing. Just because it is thus simple, it wears the form of something immediate. Its mediation, becoming, lies behind it; that mediation has sublated its own self, and existence for that reason shows up as a first, one that gets started out from.

It is not mere being, but existence. Etymologically taken, being at a certain place; but the representation of space does not belong here. Existence, in the wake of its becoming, is being in general with a non-being, though in such fashion that this non-being has been received into simple unity together with being; existence is determinate being in general.

Owing to the immediacy in which being and nothing are one within existence, neither reaches out past the other; rather, just so far as the existent is something that is, just so far is it something that is not, just so far is it determinate. Being here is not the universal, nor is determinateness the particular. Determinateness has not as yet come loose from being; or rather it will never again come loose from it; for what now lies at the ground as the true is precisely this unity of non-being with being; on it, as their ground, every further determination arises. Whatever being steps up against determinateness from here on is no longer that first, immediate being.

2. Reality

Existence is being with a non-being. But as the immediate unity of being and nothing it is rather in the determination of being, and the positedness of this unity is therefore incomplete; for the unity contains not only being but also nothing.

a) Otherness

Existence is therefore first that unity not merely as being, but just as essentially as non-being. Or that unity is not only existence that is, but also existence that is not; non-existence.

In connection with the transition of being into nothing it was recalled in what respect that transition is immediate. The nothing is not yet posited on being, although being essentially is nothing. Existence, by contrast, already contains the nothing posited within its own self, and is thereby the very yardstick of its own incompleteness, and with that carries on its own self the necessity of getting posited as non-existence.

Second, non-existence is not pure nothing; for it is a nothing as that of existence. And this negation is taken from existence itself; but in existence it is united with being. Non-existence is therefore itself a being; it is non-existence that is. A non-existence that is, however, is itself existence. This second existence is nevertheless at the same time not existence in the same manner as at first; for it is just as much non-existence; existence as non-existence; existence as the nothing of its own self, so that this nothing of its own self is likewise existence. — Or existence is essentially otherness.

Or, put shortly by comparing it with its own self, existence is the immediate simple unity of being and nothing; but because it is unity of being and nothing, it is rather not a unity equal to itself, but is downright unequal to itself, or is otherness.

Otherness is at first otherness in and for itself, not the other of something, such that existence would have stayed standing over against the other, and such that we should have one existence and another existence. For existence has altogether passed over into otherness. Otherness is itself existence; but existence as such is the immediate; this immediacy, however, has not remained, but rather existence is existence only as non-existence, or it is otherness.

As being passed over into nothing, so existence into otherness; otherness is the nothing, yet as reference. An other is not-this; but this is likewise an other, hence also not-this. There is no existence that would not at the same time be determined as an other, or that would not carry a negative reference.

Representation grants this too. If we call one existence A, and the other B, then at first B is determined as the other. Yet A is just as much the other of B. Both are others.

In all this, however, otherness shows up as a determination foreign to the existence so determined, or as the other outside the one existence; partly in such a way that an existence gets determined as other only through the comparison drawn by a third, while for itself it is not an other, partly in such a way that it gets determined as other only for the sake of the other that lies outside it, and not in and for itself. Yet in fact each existence determines itself, for representation too, just as much as an other existence, so that no existence is left to it that would be determined only as an existence and not as an other; or no existence that would not lie outside an existence and hence not itself be an other. — Representation does indeed reach the universality of a determination, but not the necessity of that determination in and for its own self. This necessity lies, though, in this, that it has shown itself at the concept of existence that existence as such is in and for itself the other, that it holds its otherness within its own self. — But otherness is the nothing essentially as reference, or is the sundering, the removing of itself from itself, and hence this determination of otherness sets existence over against itself; which is the side that alone hovers before representation.

Third: existence itself is essentially otherness; it has passed over into it. The other is thus immediate, not a reference to something lying outside it, but an other in-and-for-itself. But so taken it is the other of its own self. — As the other of its own self it is also existence in general, or immediate. Existence therefore does not vanish in its non-existence, in its other; for this is the other of its own self; and non-existence is itself existence.

Existence maintains itself in its non-existence; it is essentially one with it, and essentially not one with it. Existence therefore stands in reference to its otherness; it is not purely its otherness; otherness is at the same time essentially contained within it, and at the same time still separated from it; it is being-for-other.