CHAP. V. Of REASON, and SCIENCE.

When a man Reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceivea sum total, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder; from Subtraction of one sum from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Subtracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equal; and Division, but Subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficial,) angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences of words; adding together two Names, to make an Affirmation; and two Affirmations, to make a Syllogism; and many Syllogisms to make a Demonstration; and from the sum, or Conclusion of a Syllogism, they subtract one Proposition, to find the other. Writers of Politics, add together Pactions, to find men's duties; and Lawyers, Laws, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) whatthat is, which is meant by this word Reason, when we reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of general names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

And as in Arithmetic, unpractised men must, and Professorsthemselves may often err, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and infer false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it self is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetic is a certain and infallible Art: But no one man's Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other men's reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claim they lay to it.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the sum, andtruth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he pays for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but only believeth.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be donein particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-will; or any Free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an Error; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excel all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to general Rules, called Theorems, or Aphorisms; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not only in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or subtracted from another.

But this privilege, is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions;that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connection of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving ofnames of bodies, to accidents; or of accidents, to bodies; As they do, that say, Faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be poured, or breathed into any thing, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasms are spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents ofbodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the air, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, orspeeches; as they do that say, that there be things universal; that a living creature is Genus, or a general thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names andspeeches; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a man's command is his will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricalfigures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawful to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb says this or that (whereas ways cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, andlearned by rote from the Schools, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-Now, and the like canting of Schoolmen.

To him that can avoid these things, it is not easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, bornewith us; nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is; but attained by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connection of one of them to another; and so to Syllogisms, which are the Connections of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so far from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their natural Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so far out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of human minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Increase of Science, the way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though we usually have one name of Wisdom for them both; yet the Latins did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use, and dexterity in handling his arms; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both useful; but the later infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

The signs of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when only some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible. But in any business, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by general sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councils of the Common-wealth, love to show their reading of Politics and History, very few do it in their domestic affairs, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affairs: but in public they study more the reputation of their own wit, than the success of another's business.

CHAP. VI. Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS. And the Speeches by which they are expressed.

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them:One called Vital; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the Blood, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoction, Nutrition, Excretion, to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other is Animal motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we See, Hear, And that Fancy is but the Relics of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already said in the first and second Chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internal beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortness of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the general name;and the other, often-times restrained to signify the Desire of Food,namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromwardsomething, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latins; and they both of them signifythe motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are ὁρμὴ, and ἀφορμὴ. For Nature it self does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere Appetite to go, or move, no actual Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphorical Motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though Words may be called metaphorical; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATEthose things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, andLove, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we always signify the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signify the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feel in their Bodies;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to taste and try. But Aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said toContemn: CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a man's Body, is in continual mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much less can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

But whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite or Desire; thatis it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,and Aversion, Evil; And of his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evil, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

The Latin Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evil; but are not precisely the same; And those are pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that,which by some apparent signs promiseth Good; and the later, that,which promiseth Evil. But in our Tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fair; in others Beautiful, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foul, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signify nothing else, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and Evil. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightful; and Goodas the Means, which is called Vtile, Profitable; and as many of Evil:For Evil, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; Evil in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and Evil in the Means,Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtful.

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have said before) only Motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Ear, Sound; to the Nostril, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Ears, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call DELIGHT,or TROUBLE OF MIND.

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitalmotion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (à Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, fromhindering, and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of Evil. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or less; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or less Displeasure and Offence.

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures of Sense, (The wordsensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be Laws.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these arePleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are somein the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of consequences,and are called GRIEF.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it self.

For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

The same, without such opinion, DESPAIR.

Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEAR.

The same, with hope of avoiding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Constant Despair, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL,CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESS: a name used always in significationof blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another's attaining them; though the desire in it self, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Desire of Office; or precedence, AMBITION: a name used alsoin the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear ofthings that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Magnanimity, in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY.

Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS;or PARSIMONY; as it is liked, or disliked.

Love of Persons for society, KINDNESS.

Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense only, NATURAL LUST.

Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imaginationof Pleasure past, LUXURY.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved,THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, JEALOUSY.

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some factof his own, REVENGEFULNESS.

Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no livingcreature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not only by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal Pleasure.

Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION.And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine,TRUE RELIGION.

Fear, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANICTERROR; called so from the Fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth, there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper toMan, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which ifgrounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAIN-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a wellgrounded Confidence begetteth Attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vain.

Grief, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTIONof mind.

The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces calledLAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own,that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.

On the contrary, Sudden Dejection, is the passion that causethWEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take awaysome vehement hope, or some prop of their power: And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps external, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore some Weep for the loss of Friends; Others for their unkindness; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custom taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests ; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Grief, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, orthe passion that discovereth it self in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a sign of the love of good reputation; and commendable: In old men it is a sign of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Grief, for the Calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pity; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.For, that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Grief, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: But joined with Endeavourto supplant, or hinder a Competitor, ENVY.

When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despair, or Fear to attempt it; the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no less in other living Creatures than in Man: and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then said to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts thathave Deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a Rational Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rational Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not only actions that have their beginning from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.

The forms of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, arepartly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signify suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in general words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as Do this, forbear that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or else Counsel. The language of Vain-Glory, of Indignation, Pity and Revengefulness, Optative: But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other language of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signify as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signs of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so faras a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences, be greater than the Evil, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the Evil exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent, or Seeming Evil: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsel unto others,

Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that mencall FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life it self is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Fear, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men Beatifical Vision is unintelligible.

The form of Speech whereby men signify their opinion of the Goodness of any thing, is PRAISE. That whereby they signify thepower and greatness of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And thatwhereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's Felicity, is by the Greeks called μακαρισμός, for which we have no name in ourtongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.

CHAP. VII. Of the Ends, or Resolutions of DISCOURSE.

OF all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

If the Discourse be merely Mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's Discourse, you leave him in a Presumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him thatdiscourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditional. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but only, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connection of the same into general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogisms; the End or last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE.But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not Definitions; or if the Definitions be not rightly joined together into Syllogisms, then the End or Conclusion, is again OPINION, namely ofthe truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUSof it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evil act, for any man to speak against his Conscience: or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.

When a man's Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELIEF, andFAITH: Faith, in the man; Belief, both of the man, and of thetruth of what he says. So that in Belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To have faith in, or trust to , or believe a man, signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to believe what is said, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this Phrase, I believe in; as also the Latin, Credo in; and the Greek, πιστεύω εἰς are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I believe him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin, Credo illi; fido illi: and in Greek, πιστεύω αὐτῷ: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Believing in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it self, or from the principles of natural Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion we have, of him that hath said it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him only. And consequently, when we Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, our Belief, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men only.

CHAP. VIII. Of the VIRTUES commonly called INTELLECTUAL; and their contrary DEFECTS.

VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat thatis valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Virtues INTELLECTUAL, are always understood such abilities of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good wit; though the same word Wit, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

These Virtues are of two sorts; Natural, and Acquired. By Natural,I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Virtues. But I mean, that Wit, which is gotten by Use only, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALWIT, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and steady direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULLNESS, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quickness, is caused by the difference of men's passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversationand business; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Virtue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy,without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Virtue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it self, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Virtue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not only by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without Steadiness, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madness; such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdraws a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epic, or Dramatic; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodness consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choice of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Praise, and in Invectives, the Fancy is predominant; because the design is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Design in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Council, and all rigorous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit; to admit them into Council, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a sign of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, profane, clean, obscene grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verbal discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physician may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himself before good company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in professed remissness of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and equivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in public, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Jingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is only in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a design in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that design; or what design they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not easy, or usual, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE;and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equal in age, is not much unequal, as to the quantity; but lies in different occasions; every one having his private designs. To govern well a family, and a kingdom, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of business; no more than to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater than the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affairs of his own house, then a Privy Counsellor in the affairs of another man.

To Prudence, if you add the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Fear, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdom, which is called CRAFT; which is a sign ofPusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latins call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater; as when a man robs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking money at usury, for the present payment of interest.

As for acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,)there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Wits, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no less difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not only from the difference of men's complexions; but also from their difference of customs, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but several sorts of Power.

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men term it indifferent; though he may be so far a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Steadiness of the minds motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dullness; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESS, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehementPassions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESS.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evil constitution of the organs of the Body, or harm done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madness is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madness, is either great vain-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and self-conceit; or great Dejection of mind.

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excess whereof, is the Madness called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passthat excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habitual, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealousy, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a man's own self, for divine inspiration, for wisdom, learning, form, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddiness: The same, joined with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Dejection, subjects a man to causeless fears; which is a Madness commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners;as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In sum, all Passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour, are called by the general name of Madness. But of the several kinds of Madness, he that would take the pains, might enrol a legion. And if the Excesses be madness, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evil, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible always in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madness can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madness in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, though we perceive no great unquietness, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madness; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertain you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madness.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Error generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madness is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evil disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others Laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their several domineering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part mere Madness.

The opinions of the world, both in ancient and later ages, concerning the cause of madness, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Demons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possess him, and move his organs in such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes Demoniacs, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is, agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not only Pazzi, Madmen; but also Spiritati, men possessed.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extreme hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambics, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the coming on of Winter: And this madness was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there reigned a fit of madness in another Grecian City, which seized only the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Devil. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemn also their honour, gave counsel to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story says cured that madness. But on the other side, the same Grecians, did often ascribe madness, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furies; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to Phantasms, as to think them aerial living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jews; For they called mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Demoniacs; and some of them called both Prophets, and Demoniacs, mad-men; and some called the same man both Demoniac, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Virtues; and many natural accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Demons. So that a man was to understand by Demon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Devil. But for the Jews to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voice of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Moral, or Ceremonial, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasm; or any Possession. When God is said, Numb. 11. 25. to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give to the 70 Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a man's spirit, inclined to Godliness. And where it is said Exod. 28. 3. Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron, is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdom of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not always, yet as often as the virtue or vice so styled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasm; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voice, Vision, or Dream; and the Burden of the Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jews fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search natural causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the gross pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusual ability, or defect in a man's mind; unless they see withal, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it natural; and if not natural, they must needs think it supernatural; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Devil is in him? And hence it came to pass, when our Saviour Mark 3. 21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out devils; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some said, He hath a Devil, and is mad; whereas others holding him for a Prophet, said, These are not the words of one that hath a Devil. So in the old Testament he that came to anoint Jehu, 2 Kings 9. 11. was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, What came that mad-man for? So that in sum, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himself in extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jews to be possessed either with a good, or evil spirit; except by the Sadducees, who erred so far on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very near to direct Atheism;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to term such men Demoniacs, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possessed; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to show unto men the kingdom of God, and to prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their natural Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Devil, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did, (and Enchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Devil or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8. 26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Devil. And whereas many of those Devils are said to confess Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himself; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a belief, that Demoniacs were any other thing but Mad-men.

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; whichmay also be numbered amongst the sorts of Madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the School-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoolman into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will, &c. into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by Which it may help it to work? They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Book, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White ness, Round ness, Magnitude, Quality, Corruptibility, all which are incorporeal, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes, and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean always things, that being incorporeal, are nevertheless moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbered amongst the many sorts of Madness; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucid Intervals. And thus much of the Virtues and Defects Intellectual.

CHAP. IX. Of the Several SUBJECTS of KNOWLEDGE.

There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge of Fact: the other Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witness. The later is called Science; and is Conditional; as when we know, that, If the figure shown be a Circle, then any straight line through the Center shall divide it into two equal parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called Natural History; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependence on Man's Will; Such as are the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civil History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following Table.

Place this Table between folio 40. and 41.

CHAP. X. Of POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, and WORTHINESS.

The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his presentmeans, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Original, or Instrumental.

Natural Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Form, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumental are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of human Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Natural, or Civil, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joined with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a man's Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good success is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdom, or good fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is increase of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but only in those Commonwealths, where it has Privileges: for in such privileges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Form is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

Arts of public use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they confer to Defence, and Victory, are Power: And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Soldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.

The public worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY.And this Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, public Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.

To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is to HONOUR; becausea sign we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeys them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting another's good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a sign we seek his protection or aid. To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To show any sign of love, or fear of another, is to Honour; for both to love, and to fear, is to value. To contemn, or less to love or fear, than he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnify, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but goodness, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pity, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; sign of opinion of his virtue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour,

To hearken to a man's counsel, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a sign we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signs of Honour, or which the Law or Custom makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a sign of approving his judgement, and wisdom. To dissent, is Dishonour, and an upbraiding of error; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a sign of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.

To employ in counsel, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a sign of opinion of his wisdom, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these ways of Honouring, are natural; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signs of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Sovereign doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or Employment, or Action, that he himself will have taken for a sign of his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecai, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclaiming, Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to wear one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should wear it as the Kings fool; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civil Honour, the Fountain is in the person of the Common-wealth, and dependeth on the Will of the Sovereign; and is therefore temporary, and called Civil Honour; such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutcheons painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many signs of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argumentand sign of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none,Dishonourable.

Dominion, and Victory is Honourable; because acquired by Power; and Servitude, for need, or fear, is Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a sign of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a sign of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Error, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as far forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a sign of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steadiness of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steadiness of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a sign of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they the more easily attain the aids, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joined with loss, are Honourable; as signs of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a sign of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Covetousness of great Riches, and ambition of great Honours, are Honourable; as signs of power to obtain them. Covetousness, and ambition, of little gaines, or preferments, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a sign of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth only in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not think they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymn of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Music at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattle of Apollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Commonwealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pirate, or a High-way Thief; but rather a lawful Trade, not only amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of ancient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and always will be Honourable, though unlawful, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is always Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashness, are driven into the Lists to avoid disgrace.

Scutcheons, and Coats of Arms hereditary, where they have anyeminent Privileges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in such Privileges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Ancient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customs were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The ancient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a sign of Poverty, and of a common Soldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custom; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Western parts of the world.

For Germany, being anciently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutcheon, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And this ornament both of the Arms, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joined together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herald, to distinguish Scutcheons, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and ancient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but virtue military. Afterwards, not only Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scutcheons, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompense to their service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek and Latin, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron,are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Sovereign Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latin Duces, being Generals in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the General company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gauls, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gauls, that Vir in Latin; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the original of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In process of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into mere Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

WORTHINESS, is a thing different from the worth, or value ofa man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESS, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that nevertheless, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, presupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

CHAP. XI. Of the difference of MANNERS.

BY MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of man-kind, thatconcern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost aim,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Moral Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the Object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind,a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Laws, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, inclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Desire of Ease, and sensual Delight, disposeth men to obey a commonPower: Because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason.On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, inclineth men to obey acommon Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please themwhose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equal,greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom; which is to ones equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid, and service mutual; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgiveness; both which are hateful.

Fear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aidby society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

Men that distrust their own subtlety, are in tumult, and sedition,better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wife, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the procincts of battle, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of Wit.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselvesof great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are inclined only to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter ofgovernment, are disposed to Ambition. Because without public Employment in counsel or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are inclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently tolose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, 'tis a sign, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is Pusillanimity.

Frugality, (though in poor men a Virtue,) maketh a man unapt to achieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them thathave it; because the former is seeming Wisdom, the later seeming Kindness. Add to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or ratherconstraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding,disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has only a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of Right, Equity,Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custom and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custom to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which only use this false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle, should be equal to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events,to the causes immediate, and Instrumental: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Public, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the public Revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the public Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for fear of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as tobelieve many times impossibilities: For such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it self without Malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causesof things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man fromconsideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternal; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance it self, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Fear of things invisible, is the natural Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or fear that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into Laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

CHAP. XII. OF RELIGION.

Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of Religion, but in Manonly; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also only in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive intothe Causes of the Events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, tothink also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoyingof their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causesof all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignoranceof causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by human Fear: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to be fall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feign them.

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancied;they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soul of man; and that the Soul of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be real, and external Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latins called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal, or Immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternal God, choose rather to confess he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of Bodies Visible.

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agentswrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependence or connection at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; The Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Liturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to Powersinvisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men thethings which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

And in these four things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of secondcauses, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casual for Prognostics, consisteth the Natural seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. Onesort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandment, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relied on them, the more apt to Obedience, Laws, Peace, Charity, and civil Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of human Politics; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politics; and containeth Precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the Kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the Laws of the Kingdom of God.

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerningthe nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or Devil; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dog, a Snake, an Onion, a Leek, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Daemons: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyrs; the Woods, with Fauns, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountain, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spiritual Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of Fairies, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to mere Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Virtue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evil, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Devil.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is men's Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial Gods; ascribing the cause of Fecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtlety and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and storms, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of business.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Islands; and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not only by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrel Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger. Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostics of time to come; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious ways of Divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the Priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by design, to own the event both ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Caverns: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibyls; of whose Prophecies (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republics Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy: Sometimes in the aspect of the Stars at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casual flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrails of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casual words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusual accidents; as Eclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshow some great Calamity to come: Sometimes, in mere Lottery, as Cross and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Commonwealthsamongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their Laws might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the Kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a Dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Laws. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sickness, Earthquakes, and each man's private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtained in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivals, and public Games, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of tolerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it self; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their Civil Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who (being the peculiar Kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

But where God himself, by supernatural Revelation, plantedReligion; there he also made to himself a peculiar Kingdom; and gave Laws, not only of behaviour towards himself; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdom of God, the Policy, and laws Civil, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporal, and Spiritual Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command of the whole Army, should have withal a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speak more largely of the Kingdom of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understandthe causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new Religions may again be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Government of Religion, shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the fear of the Civil Sword) contradicted and rejected.

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisdom, in him thatformeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing,or saying of such things, as appear to be signs, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Profaneness, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these roots, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the belief they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, canbe no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater belief, than what the Custom, and Laws of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in natural things, men of judgement require natural signs, and arguments; so in supernatural things, they require signs supernatural, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of men's faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40. days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up a Golden Calf for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles failing, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, being constituted by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cried out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice failing, Faith also failed: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that success, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendom; insomuch, as the failing of Virtue in the Pastors, maketh Faith fail in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the School-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those Princes, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all foreign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unless a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawful Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Allegiance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretic? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdom given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminal? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively Faith, if (as I said) the civil Magistrate, and Custom did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdom, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.