CHAP. XI. Of the difference of MANNERS.

BY MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of man-kind, thatconcern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost aim,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Moral Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the Object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ only in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind,a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Laws, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, inclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Particularly, competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Desire of Ease, and sensual Delight, disposeth men to obey a commonPower: Because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason.On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war; and to stir up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by war; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, inclineth men to obey acommon Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please themwhose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joys, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joys of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equal,greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom; which is to ones equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superior, inclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerful acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equal, or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid, and service mutual; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgiveness; both which are hateful.

Fear of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aidby society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

Men that distrust their own subtlety, are in tumult, and sedition,better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wife, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being always in the procincts of battle, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtlety of Wit.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselvesof great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are inclined only to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are inclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdom in matter ofgovernment, are disposed to Ambition. Because without public Employment in counsel or magistracy, the honour of their wisdom is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are inclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdom, both to themselves and others.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently tolose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, 'tis a sign, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is Pusillanimity.

Frugality, (though in poor men a Virtue,) maketh a man unapt to achieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them thathave it; because the former is seeming Wisdom, the later seeming Kindness. Add to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or ratherconstraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concerns, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding,disposeth men to take on trust, not only the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Heresy: and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion; but has only a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one.

Ignorance of the causes, and original constitution of Right, Equity,Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custom and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custom to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which only use this false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evil manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason, and from reason to custom, as it serves their turn; receding from custom when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle, should be equal to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events,to the causes immediate, and Instrumental: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to pass, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Public, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the public Revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the public Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for fear of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Ignorance of natural causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as tobelieve many times impossibilities: For such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it self without Malice, is able to make a man both to believe lies, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causesof things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man fromconsideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternal; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance it self, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Fear of things invisible, is the natural Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or fear that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into Laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

CHAP. XII. OF RELIGION.

Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of Religion, but in Manonly; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also only in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive intothe Causes of the Events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, tothink also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoyingof their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependence of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembereth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself.

The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causesof all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repaired in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignoranceof causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by human Fear: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to be fall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feign them.

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancied;they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soul of man; and that the Soul of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be real, and external Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latins called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal, or Immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternal God, choose rather to confess he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of Bodies Visible.

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agentswrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependence or connection at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; The Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Liturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to Powersinvisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men thethings which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostics of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

And in these four things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of secondcauses, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casual for Prognostics, consisteth the Natural seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. Onesort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandment, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relied on them, the more apt to Obedience, Laws, Peace, Charity, and civil Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of human Politics; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politics; and containeth Precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the Kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the Laws of the Kingdom of God.

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerningthe nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or Devil; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dog, a Snake, an Onion, a Leek, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Daemons: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyrs; the Woods, with Fauns, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountain, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spiritual Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdom of Fairies, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to mere Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Virtue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evil, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Devil.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is men's Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptness to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministerial Gods; ascribing the cause of Fecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtlety and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and storms, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of business.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to be used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other human uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Islands; and have attributed to them, not only the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not only by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrel Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger. Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomy, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostics of time to come; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious ways of Divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senseless answers of the Priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by design, to own the event both ways; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Caverns: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibyls; of whose Prophecies (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republics Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasm; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy: Sometimes in the aspect of the Stars at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and fears, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casual flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrails of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casual words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusual accidents; as Eclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshow some great Calamity to come: Sometimes, in mere Lottery, as Cross and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vain conceits. So easy are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Commonwealthsamongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their Laws might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the Kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a Dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Laws. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sickness, Earthquakes, and each man's private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtained in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivals, and public Games, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of tolerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it self; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their Civil Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who (being the peculiar Kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

But where God himself, by supernatural Revelation, plantedReligion; there he also made to himself a peculiar Kingdom; and gave Laws, not only of behaviour towards himself; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdom of God, the Policy, and laws Civil, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporal, and Spiritual Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command of the whole Army, should have withal a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speak more largely of the Kingdom of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understandthe causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernatural; that can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new Religions may again be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Government of Religion, shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the fear of the Civil Sword) contradicted and rejected.

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisdom, in him thatformeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is already formed, is the enjoining of a belief of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoin the belief of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernatural: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing,or saying of such things, as appear to be signs, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Profaneness, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these roots, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withal, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of private ends: as when the belief they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves only, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, canbe no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater belief, than what the Custom, and Laws of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in natural things, men of judgement require natural signs, and arguments; so in supernatural things, they require signs supernatural, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of men's faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40. days, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up a Golden Calf for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles failing, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, being constituted by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cried out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice failing, Faith also failed: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians increased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that success, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendom; insomuch, as the failing of Virtue in the Pastors, maketh Faith fail in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the School-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spiritual subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutual emulation of those Princes, they might without war, or trouble, exclude all foreign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unless a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawful Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Allegiance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretic? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdom given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminal? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signs of private interest, enough to mortify the most lively Faith, if (as I said) the civil Magistrate, and Custom did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdom, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not only amongst Catholics, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.

CHAP. XIII. Of the NATURAL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery.

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, andmind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the fame danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat else,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of ones own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in theattaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an Invader hath no more to fear, than an other man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for anyman to secure himself, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: And upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflection in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a commonPower to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For WAR, consisteth not in Battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of War; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of War, whereevery man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be Laws, and public Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Laws be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil War.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continual Spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent;that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in war the two Cardinal virtues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Fear of Death; Desireof such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. XIV. Of the first and second NATURAL LAWS, and of CONTRACTS.

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly callJus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper significationof the word, the absence of external Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generalRule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear;Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in theprecedent Chapter) is a condition of War of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of War. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamental Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The Second, the sum of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves.

From this Fundamental Law of Nature, by which men are commandedto endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of War. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to divest himself of his: For that were to expose himself to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospel; Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that Law of all men, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.

To lay down a man's Right to any thing, is to divest himself ofthe Liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another man's defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right original.

Right is laid aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferringit to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING;when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not tohinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to makevoid that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being beforerenounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholars is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so Renounce, or Transfer; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signs are either Words only, or Actions only; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words, and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word,) but from Fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; itis either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himself. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned; or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any Good to himself. The same may be said of Wounds; and Chains, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the End, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

The mutual transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it self. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling with ready money; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both partsmay contract now, to perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and the failing of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith.

When the transferring of Right, is not mutual; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signify one and thesame thing.

Signs of Contract, are either Express, or by Inference. Express, are words spoken with understanding of what they signify: And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I have Granted, I will that this be yours: Or of the future; as, I will Give, I will Grant: which words of the future, are called PROMISE.

Signs by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a sign by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a barepromise, are an insufficient sign of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To morrow I will Give, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow, then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words; Volo hoc tuum esse cras, and Cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine to morrow, and, I will give it thee to morrow: For the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transfer a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of the Will to transfer a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to pass by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them run.

In Contracts, the right passeth, not only where the words are ofthe time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future: because all Contract is mutual translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERITthat which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth; or money is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the money; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by virtue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free gift, I am enabled to Merit only by the benignity of the Giver: In Contract, I merit at the Contractors hand that he should depart with his right; In this case of Gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than another's. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schools, between Meritum congrui, and Meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinked with carnal desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the Free Grace of God only; they say, no man can Merit Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirm any thing of their meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claim the Prize as Due.

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performpresently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere Nature, (which is a condition of War of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is Void: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance; it is not Void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the fear of some coercive Power; which in the condition of mere Nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civil estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the Will not to perform: else it cannot make the Covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoyingit, as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to transfer the Herbage, and whatsoever grows upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the Right of government in Sovereignty, are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain Soldiers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

To make Covenants with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because notunderstanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no Covenant.

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation ofsuch as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernatural, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name: For otherwise we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is always something thatfalleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it self,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.

Men are freed of their Covenants two ways; by Performing; orby being Forgiven. For Performance, is the natural end of obligation; and Forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere Nature,are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of mere Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their Ransom, are obliged to pay it: And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless (as hath been said before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my self from a Thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the Civil Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A former Covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passedaway his Right to one man to day, hath it not to pass to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

A Covenant not to defend my self from force, by force, is alwaysvoid. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down his Right to save himself from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoiding whereof is the only End of laying down any Right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, Unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot Covenant thus, Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.

A Covenant to accuse ones self, without assurance of pardon, islikewise invalid. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civil State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: and where a man's Testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himself by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weakto hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in man's nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Fear of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to break it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensual Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very general Objects: one, The Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, The Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the fear of the later is commonly the greater Fear. The Fear of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civil Society. The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of mere Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battle. So that before the time of Civil Society, or in the interruption thereof by War, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Fear as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to Civil Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing, or OATH, is aForm of Speech, added to a Promise; by which he that promiseth, signifieth, that unless he perform, he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself. Such was the Heathen Form, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast. So is our Form, I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God. And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater.

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any otherForm, or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And that there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for fear, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but profaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custom, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

It appears also, that the Oath adds nothing to the Obligation. Fora Covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.

CHAP. XV. Of other Laws of Nature.

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferto another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That men perform their Covenants made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of War.

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originalof JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

But because Covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of notperformance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the Original of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of War, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutual Contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schools: For they say, that Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civil Power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

The Fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the fear of God, (for the same Fool hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not only the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The Kingdom of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, Successful wickedness hath obtained the name of Virtue: and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdom. And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he says, If the right Heir of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the Attainder be void: From which instances a man will be very prone to infer; that when the Heir apparent of a Kingdom, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no Civil Power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him perform; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of War, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and Defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Sovereignty by Rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against, the Sovereign Power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, donevertheless make exception of certain persons; as Heretics, and such as use not to perform their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it.

The names of Just, and Injust, when they are attributed to Men,signify one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signify Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signify the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language styled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, or forbears to do, for fear: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to human Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Nobleness or Gallantness of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Justice is called a Virtue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltless: and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of Guilty.

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude todo Injury; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individual person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individual person Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the Master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endamaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signifiedto the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant: and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, andDistributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmetical; the later in proportion Geometrical. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of equal merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he perform his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shown in due place.

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does GRATITUDEdepend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Freegift: and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Form, That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of mere Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himself; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamental Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant,

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLAISANCE; that is to say, That every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in men's aptness to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it self fills; and for the hardness, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as cumbersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not only by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamental Law of Nature, which commandeth to seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latins call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

A sixth Law of Nature, is this, That upon caution of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is sign of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh is, That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,)Men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is always somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of War; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly styled by the name of Cruelty.

And because all signs of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this Precept, That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another. The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition ofmere Nature; where, (as has been shown before,) all men are equal. The inequality that now is, has bin introduced by the Laws civil. I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himself to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their own wisdom, do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men unequal; yet because men that think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of Nature, I put this, 'That every man acknowledge other for his Equal by Nature. The breach of this Precept is Pride.

On this law, dependeth another, That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himself any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list: so is it necessary for man's life, to retain some; as right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of natural equality, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law πλεονεξία; that is, a desire of more than their share.

Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a preceptof the Law of Nature, that he deal Equally between them. For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by War. He therefore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deter men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamental Law of Nature) is the cause of War.

The observance of this law, from the equal distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have said before) distributive Justice: the violation, Acception of persons, προσωποληψία.

And from this followeth another law, That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right. For otherwise the distribution is Unequal, and contrary to Equity.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyedin common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot. For equal distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Natural. Arbitrary, isthat which is agreed on by the Competitors: Natural, is either Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Κληρονομία, which signifies, Given by Lot; ) or First Seizure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and in some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

It is also a Law of Nature, That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct. For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.

And because, though men be never so willing to observe theseLaws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unless the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, That they that are at controversy, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to hisown benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversy, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received forArbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an unavoidable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

And in a controversy of Fact, the Judge being to give no more creditto one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Laws of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of Civil Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the Laws ofNature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy self; which showeth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Laws of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Laws of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The Laws of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bindto a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all Laws of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that having sufficient Security, that others shall observe the same Laws towards him, observes them not himself, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Laws bind in foro interno, may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law; which where the Obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.

The Laws of Nature are Immutable and Eternal; For Injustice,Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that War shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

The sames Laws, because they oblige only to a desire, and endeavour,I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

And the Science of them, is the true and only Moral Philosophy.For Moral Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evil, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind. Good, and Evil, are names that signify our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not only in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of mere Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evil: And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have showed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Moral Virtues; and their contrary Vices, Evil. Now the science of Virtue and Vice, is Moral Philosophy; and therefore the true Doctrine of the Laws of Nature, is the true Moral Philosophy. But the Writers of Moral Philosophy, though they acknowledge the same Virtues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodness; nor that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Laws, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same Theorems, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Laws.

CHAP. XVI. Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things Personated.

A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.

When they are considered as his own, then is he called a Natural Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificial person.

The word Person is latin: instead whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον,which signifies the Face, as Persona in latin signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunals, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himself, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his Person, or act in his name; (in which sense Cicero useth it where he says, Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I bear three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;) and is called in diverse occasions, diversely; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Of Persons Artificial, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In whichcase the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latin Dominus, in Greek κύριος; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwaysunderstood a Right of doing any act: and done by Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is.

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenantby Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14.) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature bycommand of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation ofthe Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himself the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor only; there being no Author but himself.

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented byFiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governors of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civil Government.

Likewise Children, Fools, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason,may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer than (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civil, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

An Idol, or mere Figment of the brain, may be Personated; aswere the Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But Idols cannot be Authors: for an Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of Civil Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly by the Son of man, his own Son, our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews, and induce all Nations into the Kingdom of his Father; not as of himself, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himself; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by oneman, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; theycannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voice of thegreater number, must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excess of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the Representative hath.

And a Representative of even number, especially when the numberis not great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voices equal in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemn, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemn, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time: For when the voices are equal, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

Or if the number be odd, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of War.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditional, are generally called SURETIES, in Latin Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

OF COMMON-WEALTH.

CHAP. XVII. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH.

The final Cause, End, or Design of men, (who naturallylove Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of War, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shown) to the natural Passionsof men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Laws of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

For the Laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in sum) doing to others, as we would be done to,) of themselves, without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Laws of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to rob and spoil one another, has been a Trade, and so far from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Laws therein, but the Laws of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Families did then; so now do Cities and Kingdoms which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; andare remembered for it in after ages with honour.

Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions bedirected according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Laws of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any Civil Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last allthe time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battle, or one War. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a War amongst themselves.

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociablyone with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst Political creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally War; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civil war.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likeness of Evil; and Evil, in the likeness of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of Good and Evil; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between Injury, and Damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to show his Wisdom, and control the Actions of them that govern the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Natural; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able todefend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to bear their Person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common Peace and Safety; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my self, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latin CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this Authority, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth;which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.

And he that carrieth this Person, is called SOVEREIGN, andsaid to have Sovereign Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Sovereign Power, is by two ways. One, by Natural force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by War subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Political Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.

CHAP. XVIII. Of the RIGHTS of Sovereigns by Institution.

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude ofmen do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all theRights, and Faculties of him, or them, on whom Sovereign Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are notobliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transfer their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Sovereignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Sovereign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Sovereign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Sovereignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, isgiven to him they make Sovereign, by Covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Sovereign; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Sovereign maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a several Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many several Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Sovereign at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Sovereignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public Sword; that is, from the untied hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Sovereign; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declareda Sovereign; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author ofall the Actions, and Judgments of the Sovereign Instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do injury to ones self, is impossible. It is true that they that have Sovereign power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

Fifthly, and consequently to that which was said last, no man that hath Sovereign power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Sovereign; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himself.

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence ofthem all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Sovereignty, to be Judge both of the means of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

Sixthly, it is annexed to the Sovereignty, to be Judge of what Opinionsand Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what, men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all books before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the well governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of men's Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfulness of Governors, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, and rough bustling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never break the Peace, but only sometimes awake the War. For those men that are so remissly governed, that they dare take up Arms, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in War; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Arms for fear of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battle continually. It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Sovereign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; thereby to prevent Discord and Civil War.

Seventhly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the whole power ofprescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call Propriety. For before constitution of Sovereign Power (as hath already been shown) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth War: and therefore this Propriety, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Sovereign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the public peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evil, Lawful, and Unlawful in the actions of Subjects, are the Civil Laws, that is to say, the Laws of each Common-wealth in particular; though the name of Civil Law be now restrained to the ancient Civil Laws of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Laws at that time were in these parts the Civil Law.

Eighthly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civil, or Natural, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Laws concerning Meum and Tuum are in vain; and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of War; and contrary to the end for which every Commonwealth is instituted.

Ninthly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the Right of makingWar, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end; and to levy money upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Sovereign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Sovereign. And therefore whosoever is made General of an Army, he that hath the Sovereign Power is always Generalissimo.

Tenthly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the choosing of all Counsellors,Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in Peace, and War. For seeing the Sovereign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

Eleventhly, to the Sovereign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporal, or pecuniarypunishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them,Emulation, Quarrels, Factions, and at last War, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Laws of Honour, and a public rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Laws in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not only the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Sovereignty. To the Sovereign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signs of respect, in public or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Sovereignty; andwhich are the marks, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Sovereign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coin Money; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heirs; to have preemption in Markets; and all other Statute Prerogatives, may be transferred by the Sovereign; and yet the Power to protect his Subjects be retained. But if he transfer the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Laws: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Money; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, a Kingdom divided in it self cannot stand: For unless this division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civil War; first between those that disagreed in Politics; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Sovereign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been.

And because they are essential and inseparable Rights, it followsnecessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Sovereign Power it self be not in direct terms renounced, and the name of Sovereign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is void: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Sovereignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

This great Authority being Indivisible, and inseparably annexedto the Sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Sovereign Kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis minores, of less power than them all together. For if by all together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by all together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Sovereign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Sovereigns power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough, when the Sovereignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Sovereign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Sovereignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equal, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Stars in presence of the Sun.

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is verymiserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Sovereign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all forms, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any form of Government can possibly happen to the people in general, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civil War; or that dissolute condition of masterless men, without subjection to Laws, and a coercive Power to tie their lands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of Sovereign Governors, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their Governors to draw from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Moral and Civil Science,) to see a far off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.

CHAP. XIX. Of the several Kinds of Common-wealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Sovereign Power.

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the differenceof the Sovereign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude. And because the Sovereignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man, or more: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All, must have the Sovereign Power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, andbooks of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Forms of Government, but of the same Forms misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governors.

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if theyplease, give Authority to One man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Sovereign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but only to certain particular; ends, by the Sovereign limited. For that were to erect two Sovereigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of War, contrary to the end for which all Sovereignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Sovereign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Sovereignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other general Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.

The difference between these three kinds of Common-wealth,consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own natural Person. And though he be careful in his politic Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more or no less careful to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross the private, he prefers the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise only from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civil war.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Sovereign Assembly has need of Counsel, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightened, but dazzled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assembly can receive Counsel with secrecy, because of their own Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Human Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firm, (which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civil War.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Sovereign Power is in an Assembly: For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil Counsel, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one another's Covetousness and Ambition by turns. And whereas the Favorites of Monarchs, are few, and they have none else to advance but their own Kindred; the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Sovereign Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires less Eloquence (such is man's Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchy, that the Sovereignty may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discern between Good and Evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to govern by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Sovereign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civil War. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that form of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressly by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custom in that case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Sovereignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or damage, is not Tuition, but Treachery. So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrel, about the Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public Peace, it is not to be attributed to the form of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great Common-wealth, the Sovereignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and War, and making of Laws, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsel given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Sovereign Assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authority; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftener deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but three; that is to say, Monarchy, where One Man has it; or Democracy, where the general Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracy, where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealths that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Forms, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdoms; where Kings have the Sovereign Power put into their hands for a time; or Kingdoms, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchy. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocratical Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Country, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seem perhaps at first sight, to be a Democratical, or Aristocratical Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Sovereigns, but Ministers of the Sovereign; nor limited Kings Sovereigns, but Ministers of them that have the Sovereign Power: Nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracy, or Aristocracy of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to certain Years or Months, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of War. If it be known who have the power to give the Sovereignty after his death, it is known also that the Sovereignty was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possess, and keep to themselves, it they think good. But if there be none that can give the Sovereignty, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civil war. And consequently he was, when elected, a Sovereign absolute,

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superior to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superior, is not supreme; that is to say not Sovereign. The Sovereignty therefore was always in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a privilege to lead their Armies; but the Sovereignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into the which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of all these Forms of Government, the matter being mortal, sothat not only Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies die, it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificial Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificial Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of War in every age; and they that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governor dieth. This Artificial Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect form of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Sovereign. For if it be in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Sovereign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himself. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choice; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did Institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetual, and not temporary security,

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot fail, unless the Multitude that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that form of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dieth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Sovereign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellors, and Officers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the Sovereign Assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the public shall require it) be recalled.

The greatest difficulty about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy:And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Sovereign Authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of Inheritance, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Sovereign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Sovereign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Sovereign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equal right to submit himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a return to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution. Therefore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is always left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his express Words, and Testament; or by other tacit signs sufficient.

By express Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him inlife time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperors of Rome declared who should be their Heirs. For the word Heir does not of it self imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expressly, that such a man shall be his Heir, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

But where Testament, and express Words are wanting, other naturalsigns of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custom. And therefore where the Custom is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in possession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the Custom is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custom were to advance the Female. For whatsoever Custom a man may by a word control, and does not, it is a natural sign he wouldhave that Custom stand.

But where neither Custom, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain Monarchical; because he hath approved that government in himself. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the nearer in blood, rather than the more remote; because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin, is the nearer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives always, by reflection, the most honour from the greatness of his nearest kindred.

But if it be lawful for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession bywords of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulness of the Governors, ignorant of the true rules of Politics. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principal men of every Nation they conquered, not only the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James, aimed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civil wars, which make both those Kingdoms, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulness of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdom to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.

CHAP. XX. Of Dominion PATERNAL, and DESPOTICAL.

A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the SovereignPower is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.

And this kind of Dominion, or Sovereignty, differeth from Sovereigntyby Institution, only in this, That men who choose their Sovereign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, void: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Commonwealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Commonwealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Laws; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully perform, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Sovereign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Sovereign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.

But the Rights, and Consequences of Sovereignty, are the samein both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of War, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellors, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alleged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of Sovereignty by Institution.

Dominion is acquired two ways; By Generation, and by Conquest.The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is called PATERNAL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominionover his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either express, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be always two that are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man only, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversy in decided by the Civil Law: and for the most part, (but not always) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lieth now in the state of mere Nature; where there are supposed no laws of Matrimony; no laws for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of mere Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in thecondition of mere Nature, where there are no Matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fatherspower: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Sovereign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarchs of two several Kingdoms, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Sovereign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over the Children of the Child; and over their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.

The Right of Succession to Paternal Dominion, proceedeth in thesame manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICAL, from Δεσπότης, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant.And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominionover the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in, and Submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendering himself, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think fit.

And that which men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the Greeks called Ζωγρία, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransom, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yielding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then only is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporal liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In sum the Rights and Consequences of both Paternal and Despotical Dominion, are the very same with those of a Sovereign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Sovereignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights of Sovereignty, For the Sovereign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Sovereignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of someCommon-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Sovereign. But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unless it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Sovereign Rights, from the nature, need, and designs of men, in erecting of Common-wealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point.To Moses, the children of Israel say thus. Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die. This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, This shall be the Right of the King you will have to reign over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cooks, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tithe of your corn and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his business. He shall take the tithe of your flocks; and you shall be his servants. This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants. Again, when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars. Here is confirmed the Right that Sovereigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is contained as absolute power, as one man can possibly transfer to another. Again, the prayer of King Salomon to God, was this. Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discern between Good and Evil. It belongeth therefore to the Sovereign to be Judge, and to prescribe the Rules of discerning Good and Evil: which Rules are Laws; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anointed of God. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, Servants obey your masters in All things; and,Children obey your Parents in All things. There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternal, or Despotical Dominion. Again, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chair, and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do. There again is simple obedience. And St Paul, Warn them that they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himself acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed, where he says, Give to Caesar that which is Caesars; and payed such taxes himself. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For he himself, as King of the Jews, commanded his Disciples to take the Ass, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a she Ass tied, and her Colt with her, untie them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go. They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evil. And verse 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the Cognisance or Judicature of Good and Evil, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a trial of Adams obedience; The Devil to inflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautiful, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evil. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evil; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is said, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakedness (wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitly censure God himself. And thereupon God saith, Hast thou eaten, &c. as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandments? Whereby it is clearly, (though Allegorically,)signified, that the Commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the Sovereign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocratical Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from which the Commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking Sovereign Power too great, will seek to make it less; must subject himself, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdom long free from Sedition and Civil War. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by foreign war, the Subjects never did dispute of the Sovereign Power. But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetic and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise only: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAP. XXI. Of the LIBERTY of Subjects.

LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth (properly) the absenceof Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean external Impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it self into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those external impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it self, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.

And according to this proper, and generally received meaningof the word, A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applied to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The way is Free, no Liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Gift is Free, there is not meant any Liberty of the Gift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we speak Freely, it is not the Liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Free-will, no Liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

Fear, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth hisgoods into the Sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for fear of Imprisonment, which because no body hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men do in Common-wealths, for fear of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.

Liberty, and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hathnot only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily do: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions, would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor less. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that natural liberty, which only is properly called liberty.

But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselvesthereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificial Chains, called Civil Laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Sovereign Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, ofthe Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws pretermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if we take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporal Liberty; that is to say, freedom from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they do, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Again, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Laws, it is no less absurd, for men to demand as they do, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Laws are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath pretermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.

Nevertheless we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Sovereign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been already shown, that nothing the Sovereign Representative can do to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of the Sovereign Power; and yet neither do the other wrong: As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Sovereign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equity, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injury to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself: And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquity by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would do: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actual accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Sovereign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Liberty to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention,in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Ancient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of Particular men; but the Liberty of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Liberty in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Liberty, to do what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assembly that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romans were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Liberty to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Liberty to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer, that a particular man has more Liberty, or Immunity from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchical, or Popular, the Freedom is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Liberty; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Public only. And when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these western parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politics, (lib. 6. cap. 2.) In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civil doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Sovereign, shared amongst them the Sovereignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latin Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false show of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Sovereigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so dearly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject;that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Sovereign, he may nevertheless, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we pass away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Sovereign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the express words, I Authorise all his Actions, or from the Intention of him that submitteth himself to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Sovereignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy,

First therefore, seeing Sovereignty by Institution, is by Covenantof every one to every one; and Sovereignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shown before in the 14th Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a man's own body, are void. Therefore,

If the Sovereign command a man (though justly condemned,) tokill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Sovereign, or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confess it; because no man (as I have shown in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himself.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Sovereign Power, is contained in these words, I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural Liberty: For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my self when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my self, or my fellow. It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Sovereign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the End for which the Sovereignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Soldier to fightagainst the enemy, though his Sovereign have Right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Soldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Commonwealth. And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle, is not Injustice, but Cowardice. But he that enrolleth himself a Soldier, or taketh imprest money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it, without his Captains leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Sovereign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Sovereign Power unjustly, or committed some Capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful.

As for other Liberties, they depend on the Silence of the Law. Incases where the Sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in some times more, in other times less, according as they that have the Sovereignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it,) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible Entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And in some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversy with his Sovereign, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporal, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Sovereign. For seeing the Sovereign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by virtue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the Sovereign; and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there lieth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Virtue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every Subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Sovereign, brings it against himself.

If a Monarch, or Sovereign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is void; unless he directly renounce, or transfer the Sovereignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain terms, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Sovereign Power: and therefore the Sovereignty is still retained; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of War, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Counsellors, of levying Money, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

The Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood tolast as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Sovereignty is the Soul of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in another's sword, Nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though Sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by foreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by Intestine Discord.

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his meansof life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporal Liberty given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Liberty to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same, if he be detained on the same terms, in a foreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Sovereignty, both for himself,and his heirs; His Subjects return to the absolute Liberty of Nature; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nearest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heir. If therefore he will have no Heir, there is no Sovereignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he die without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heir. For then there can no Heir be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

If the Sovereign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he isnot Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into another's dominion, is Subject to all the Laws thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the Sovereigns, or by special licence.

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor;his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Sovereignty; and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

CHAP. XXII. Of SYSTEMS Subject, Political, and Private.

Having spoken of the Generation, Form, and Power ofa Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systems, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body natural. By SYSTEMS; I understand any numbers of men joined in one Interest, or one Business. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last precedent chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Sovereign Power, to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systems subordinate, some are Political, and some Private. Political (otherwise Called Bodies Politic, and Persons in Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the Sovereign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger. For no authority derived from foreign power, within the Dominion of another, is Public there, but Private.

And of Private Systems, some are Lawful; some Unlawful: Lawful, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawful. Irregular Systems, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evil design, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shows, or any other harmless end,) are Lawful. But when the Intention is evil, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawful.

In Bodies Politic, the power of the Representative is alwaysLimited: And that which prescribeth the Limits thereof, is the Power Sovereign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Sovereignty. And the Sovereign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the subjects; and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave: And to give leave to a Body Politic of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Sovereign cannot be understood to do, by any Grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words, are not the signs of his will, when other consequences are signs of the contrary; but rather signs of error, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Body Politic, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writ, or Letters from the Sovereign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth,which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembered without Letters, nor taken notice of, unless such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withal sealed, or testified, with the Seals, or other permanent signs of the Authority Sovereign.

And because such Limitation is not always easy, or perhaps possibleto be described in writing; the ordinary Laws, common to all Subjects, must determine, what the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

In a Body Politic, if the Representative be one man, whatsoeverhe does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Laws, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof besides himself: Because further than his Letters, or the Laws limit, he representeth no man's person, but his own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Sovereign every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Sovereign, is the act of the Sovereign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

But if the Representative be an Assembly; whatsoever that Assemblyshall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Laws, is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politic, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, unless he Voted it by procuration. It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as far-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters, (which is to such artificial, and fictitious Bodies, capital,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporal penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Politic. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are involved in their Votes.

If the person of the Body Politic being in one man, borrowmoney of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to men's own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the Sovereignty of them; and therefore the grant were either void, as proceeding from Error, commonly incident to human Nature, and an unsufficient sign of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Sovereign, and falleth not under the present question, which is only of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himself: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those only for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can engage himself, and none else, has him only for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any,) or (if there be none) out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and only they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himself for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when paid by any one, he be discharged.

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly only isobliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Money, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be paid; If he Vote if shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common Treasure only; which failing he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himself, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did nevertheless through his own folly lend his money.

It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politic subordinate, andsubject to a Sovereign Power, it is sometimes not only lawful, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registered, or to take witness of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in a Sovereign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their Sovereignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Sovereign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so always in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command everySubject is the Author.

The variety of Bodies Politic, is almost infinite: for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs, for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affairs, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politic, and their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of business, which he whose business it is, committeth to another man, to be administered for, and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Laws distinct one from another, or are far distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Sovereign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it self, there be few examples. The Romans who had the Sovereignty of many Provinces; yet governed them always by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Islands; though the government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governor; For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also inclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchical, than a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the pains of administering the business that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one Servant, than an Assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawful Act is decreed, is the Act only of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alleged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colony, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place without the Colony it self, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authority elsewhere, but are left to the remedy, which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the Laws they make; yet out of the Colony it self, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, an University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politic, if any particular member conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to the Sovereign, and those the Sovereign hath ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordain for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Sovereign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Sovereign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

In a Body Politic, for the well ordering of foreign Traffic,the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his money, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, do nevertheless bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can freight a Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to join together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the gain; according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politic, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gain the greater; which is done two ways; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politic, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular foreign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainful to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of foreign Merchandise, and but one that sells them at home; both which again are gainful to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to foreigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all foreign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the foreign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the foreigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other than Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in foreign Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gain of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politic of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is liable by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Laws, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debtor for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be laid upon every Member proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their particular adventures.

If a Mulct be laid upon the Body for some unlawful act, they only are liable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordained by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can do it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.

Those Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffic,be either perpetual, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their business. For example, if a Sovereign Monarch, or a Sovereign Assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other several parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to inform him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Laws, or for any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politic, representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is only for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Sovereign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Sovereign Assembly; and so there would be two Sovereign Assemblies, or two Sovereigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Sovereignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how far such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their Sovereign expressed.

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawful, are those that are constitutedwithout Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Laws common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as far as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestic government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Sovereigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Sovereigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawful, are those that unite themselvesinto one person Representative, without any public Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Thieves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any foreign Person, unite themselves in another's Dominion, for the easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Irregular Systems, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimesmere concourse of people, without union to any particular design, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations, become Lawful, or Unlawful, according to the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of every particular man's design therein: And his design is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutual defence,) are in a Common wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawful design; and are for that cause Unlawful, and go commonly by the name of Factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man, or Assembly (as in the condition of mere Nature) to compel them to performance, is so long only valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no human Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawful, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Sovereign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the design of them be evil, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawful. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evil intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Public, and unjustly concealed.

If the Sovereign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number ofmen, part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with money, (unless there be an express Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as men's manners are,) Justice cannot be had without money; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants,than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawful. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations not thoroughly civilized, several numerous Families have lived in continual hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government ofReligion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticals and Democraticals of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Sovereign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular System, the lawfulness, or unlawfulness, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the Concourse is lawful; as the usual meeting of men at Church, or at a public Show, in usual numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawful, and tumultuous design. It may be lawful for a thousand men, to join in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawful, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppress, and bring to Justice.

When an unusual number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawful tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voice, Great is Diana of the Ephesians; which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the Laws of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawful, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man; of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this days sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of People. Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning Systems, and Assemblies of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of man's Body; such as be Lawful, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawful, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours.

CHAP. XXIII. Of the PUBLIC MINISTERS of Sovereign Power.

IN the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Common-wealth: In this I shall speak of the parts Organical, which are Public Ministers.

A PUBLIC MINISTER, is he, that by the Sovereign,(whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affairs, with Authority to represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that hath Sovereignty, representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one Natural, and another Politic, (as a Monarch, hath the person not only of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Sovereign Assembly hath the Person not only of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly); they that be servants to them in their natural Capacity, are not Public Ministers; but those only that serve them in the Administration of the Public business. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the household of a Monarch, are Public Ministers in a Monarchy.

Of Public Ministers, some have charge committed to them ofa general Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may be committed by the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole Administration of his Kingdom. In which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Sovereign Power. Of a part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or a Sovereign Assembly, shall give the general charge thereof to a Governor, Lieutenant, Prefect or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall do in the name of the Sovereign, and that not incompatible with the Sovereigns Right. For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governors, have no other right, but what depends on the Sovereigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transfer the Sovereignty, without express and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of Public Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the several limbs of a body natural.

Others have special Administration; that is to say, charges ofsome special business, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the Economy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever public revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Public Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person Representative, and can do nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority: Public, because they serve him in his. Political Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the custody of Arms, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Soldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are public Ministers. But a Soldier without Command, though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others toteach the people their duty to the Sovereign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godliness, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the public enemy, are Public Ministers: Ministers, in that they do it not by their own Authority, but by another's; and Public, because they do it (or should do it) by no Authority, but that of the Sovereign. The Monarch, or the Sovereign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the Sovereign, receiveth his power Dei gratiâ simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Sovereigns; as in a Monarchy Dei gratiâ & Regis; or Dei providentiâ & voluntate Regis.

They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Public Ministers.For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Sovereign; and their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is essentially annexed to the Sovereignty; and therefore all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Sovereign Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are Judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same controversy, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversy between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the Sovereign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Sovereign is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to hear the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers ways; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complainant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeal to any other Judge, he can appeal no further; for his appeal is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeal to the Sovereign himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is final: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rational Judicature considered, I cannot forbear to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Public Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, I mean those, where both the Complainant and Defendant are Subjects: and by Public, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Complainant is the Sovereign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Privilege, to have for Judges in all Capital crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a Privilege of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civil controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country where the matter in controversy lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be nothing alleged by the party, why the sentence should not be final. These public persons, with Authority from the Sovereign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body natural.

Public Ministers are also all those, that have Authority fromthe Sovereign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Sovereigns Commands; to suppress Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For every act they do by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth; and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Body natural.

Public Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own Sovereign, to foreign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by public Authority, and on public Business.

But such as are sent by Authority only of some private party of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Public, nor Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though the Authority be Public; yet because the business is Private, and belonging to him in his natural capacity; is a Private person. Also if a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Business be Public; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body natural. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations of the People, and are as it were the public Ear, are Public Ministers, and represent their Sovereign in that office.

Neither a Counsellor (nor a Council of State, if we considerit with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a Public Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Sovereign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Public Ministers: In a Democracy, the Council, or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a Council; but when they appoint Judges, or hear Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Council of State is the Sovereign Assembly it self; and gives counsel to none but themselves.

CHAP. XXIV. Of the NUTRITION, and PROCREATION of a Common-wealth.

The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, inthe Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the Public use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and Minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) merely on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Foreign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: Foreign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needful for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just War, or by Labour: for a man's Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation, have nevertheless, not only maintained, but also increased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manufactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitutionof Mine, and Thine, and His; that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Sovereign Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is (as hath been already shown) a perpetual war of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety, nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in a public pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, Let the Civil Law, saith he, be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children. And again; Take away the Civil Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another man's. Seeing therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act only of the Sovereign; and consisteth in the Laws, which none can make that have not the Sovereign Power. And this they well knew of old, who called that Νόμος, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.

In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land itself: wherein the Sovereign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wilderness; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made nevertheless but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a People coming into possession of a Land by war, do not always exterminate the ancient Inhabitants, (as did the Jews,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.

From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Sovereign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed void. It is true, that a Sovereign Monarch, or the greater part of a Sovereign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evil of their Sovereign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Sovereign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Sovereigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be consideredhereafter in another place.

In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it self, may be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain the whole expense to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from human passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Public Land, or of any certain Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vain; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of mere Nature, and War, as soon as ever the Sovereign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in engaging the public stock, into a long, or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expense is not limited by their own appetite, but by external Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Public Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conqueror, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Public, but in his Natural capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects Land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those public Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appears by the late small Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.

As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assign in whatplaces, and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffic abroad, belongeth to the Sovereign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would be drawn for gain, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing men's appetites, be nevertheless noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Commonwealth, (that is, to the Sovereign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of foreign Traffic.

Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth,that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a natural property in some useful art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transfer their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutual contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Sovereign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to be made; and by what words, and signs they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the several Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the model of the whole work) is sufficient.

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities,which are not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equal value, and withal so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Money. For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between Nations; and Money (of what matter soever coined by the Sovereign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For natural Blood is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this privilege, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Money, may easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the privilege to make Common-wealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need is, into foreign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travel, but also whole Armies with Provision. But that Coin, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of air, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.

The Conduits, and Ways by which it is conveyed to the Publicuse, are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Public Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out again for public payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers again, and the Officers appointed for payment of several public or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificial Man maintains his resemblance with the Natural; whose Veins receiving the Blood from the several Parts of of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vital, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are thosewe call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governor, to inhabit a Foreign Country, either formerly void of Inhabitants, or made void then, by war. And when a Colony is settled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Sovereign that sent them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of ancient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they went, was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, than Fathers require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestic government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Sovereign authorised them to Plant.

CHAP. XXV. Of COUNSEL.

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinaryand inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words Do this, are the words not only of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsel; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases in men's writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellors, for the Precepts of them that Command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would infer, or the actions they approve. To avoid which mistakes, and render to those terms of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.

COMMAND is, where a man saith, Do this, or Do not this, withoutexpecting other reason than the Will of him that says it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will only, and the proper object of every man's Will, is some Good to himself.

COUNSEL, is where a man saith, Do, or Do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsel, pretendeth only (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between Counsel and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed to a man's own benefit; and Counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsel turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's Counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself: but to demand right to Counsel another, argues a will to know his designs, or to gain some other Good to himself; which (as I said before) is of every man's will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsel; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsel of another, is to permit him to give such Counsel as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsel to his Sovereign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsel; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsel, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Sovereign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsel to another, to do any thing contrary to the Laws, whether that Counsel proceed from evil intention, or from ignorance only, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Laws to which he is subject.

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsel, accompaniedwith signs in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsel vehemently pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tie himself therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tools of Oratory, to persuade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsel, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellor; who (by the definition of Counsel) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsel to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly; that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lieth only, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.

Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsel, are corrupt Counsellors, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsel they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellor, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a Just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not only lawful, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsels, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of sour labour; sometimes necessity, and always humanity requireth to be sweetened in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsel, rather than in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsel, we may take from the forms of Speech that express them in Holy Scripture. Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy self no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctify the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steal not, &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, Sell all thou hast; give it to the poor; and follow me, are Counsel; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have Treasure in heaven. These words, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Ass tied, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me, are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus, are Counsel; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebel; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.

As the difference of Counsel from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsel, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept Counsellors be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsel but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Virtues, and Defects of Counsel, are the same with the Virtues, and Defects Intellectual: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellors serve him in the place of Memory, and Mental Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a natural man, there is one dissimilitude joined, of great importance; which is, that a natural man receiveth his experience, from the natural objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsel to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsels always suspected, and many times unfaithful. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellor, That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellor, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such form of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firm ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash, and unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched only from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evil, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion.) obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphorical Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are useful only to deceive, or to lead him we Counsel towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellor.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No man is presumed to be a good Counsellor, but in such Business, as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered. For seeing the business of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people in Peace at home, and defend them against foreign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designs of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not only the whole sum, but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before (Chap. 8.) is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or business, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equal his Counsel, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellor.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsel to a Common-wealth, in a business that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It is necessary to be acquainted with the Intelligences, and Letters that come from thence, and with all the records of Treaties, and other transactions of State between them; which none can do, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsel, can have no good Counsel in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equal, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, than in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Public; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence draws others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politics; and give not their advice with care of the business propounded, but of the applause of their motley orations, made of the divers colored threads, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Public Business,) the Counsels of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsel from a great Assembly of Counsellors, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent Counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed Counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheel-barrow, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eyes see more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellors; but then only, when the final Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to miss their mark, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never aim but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a foreign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsel of a few; or by the mutual fear of equal factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Commonwealths, be they Popular, or Monarchical, there is no human wisdom can uphold them, longer than the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.

CHAP. XXVI. Of CIVIL LAWS.

BY CIVIL LAWS, I understand the Laws, thatmen are therefore bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Laws belongeth to them, that profess the study of the Laws of their several Countries; but the knowledge of Civil Law in general. to any man. The ancient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth: And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retain still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civil Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civil Laws. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my design being not to show what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.

And first it is manifest, that Law in general, is not Counsel, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civil Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civil Law in this manner. CIVIL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that some Laws are addressed to all the Subjects in general; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and some to particular Men; and are therefore Laws, to every of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that Laws are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Laws but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

1 The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Sovereign,be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, prescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Commonwealth is no Person, nor has capacity to do any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Sovereign;) and therefore the Sovereign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the Sovereign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

2 The Sovereign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, orone Man, is not Subject to the Civil Laws. For having power to make, and repeal Laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that subjection, by repealing those Laws that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only, is not bound.

3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not theLength of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Sovereign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, than the Sovereign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Sovereign shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Laws formerly made; the Length of Time shall bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shall be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember. And our Lawyers account no Customs Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evil Customs are to be abolished: But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Sovereign Assembly, or Monarch.

4. The Law of Nature, and the Civil Law, contain each other,and are of equal extent. For the Laws of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other moral Virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually Laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civil Laws: For it is the Sovereign Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is moral Virtue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Sovereign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civil Law. The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civil Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civil Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civil Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it self one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civil Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civil, and Natural Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civil, the other unwritten, Natural. But the Right of Nature, that is, the natural Liberty of man, may by the Civil Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Laws, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the natural liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common Enemy.

5. If the Sovereign of one Common-wealth, subdue a Peoplethat have lived under other written Laws, and afterwards govern them by the same Laws, by which they were governed before; yet those Laws are the Civil Laws of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth. For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Laws were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Laws. And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Laws, which commonly are called the Customs of each several Province, we are not to understand that such Customs have their force, only from Length of Time; but that they were anciently Laws written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Sovereigns; and are now Laws, not by virtue of the Prescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Sovereigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that Law can be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.

6. Seeing then all Laws, written, and unwritten, have their Authority,and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths the Sovereign Assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in several Commonwealths, directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges. As for example, That the Common Law, hath no Controller but the Parliament; which is true only where a Parliament has the Sovereign Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to control them, and consequently to control their controllings. And if there be no such right, then the Controller of Laws is not Parlamentum, but Rex in Parlamento. And were a Parliament is Sovereign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the hands of the Parliament. As if a Commonwealth could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to command and govern.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not the Letter, (that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the Laws, as there is in the Schools; nor yet, (as Sr. Ed. Coke makes it,) an Artificial perfection of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, (as his was.) For it is possible long study may increase, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin: and of those that study, and observe with equal time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificial Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Laws; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of Justice, the Sovereign (which is the Person of the Commonwealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Sovereign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Sovereigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consistethin declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the Command of the Commonwealth, is Law only to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice of all Laws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signs be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Sovereign, as well in Monarchies, as in other forms of government.

And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception,and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other men's words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Laws of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy self.

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civil, but Natural. For Example, if the Sovereign employ a Public Minister, without written Instructions what to do; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Sovereign, which being always understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in all things not contained in his written Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his Sovereigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Sovereignty, public and private. All which Instructions of natural Reason may be comprehended under one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of natural Justice.

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other Laws, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Sovereign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed always consonant to Equity and Reason. And in ancient time, before letters were in common use, the Laws were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandmentsupon his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, he biddeth them to teach it theirChildren, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and doors of their houses; andto assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.

Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Sovereign.For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designs, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Laws what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signs of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Sovereign, who having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out, they do not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the Sovereignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Natural Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is Sovereign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evil men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the public Registers, public Counsels, public Ministers, and public Seals; by which all Laws are sufficiently verified; Verified,I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the Law; which consisteth in the Command of the Sovereign only.

If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on theLaw of Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individual case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be useful for the avoiding of contention; yet it is but advice: tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law;every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently informed, before he do such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to do so: For when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may inform himself, if he will; the doing is unlawful. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complain before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.

If the question be of Obedience to a public Officer; To haveseen his Commission, with the Public Seal, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to do his best endeavour, to inform himself of all written Laws, that may concern his own future actions.

The Legislator known; and the Laws, either by writing, or bythe light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentic Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Laws dependeth on the Authority Sovereign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Sovereign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to bear a sense, contrary to that of the Sovereign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.

All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation.The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality, and passion, make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters. The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the final causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which final causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undo it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can do.

The Interpretation of the Laws of Nature, in a Commonwealth,dependeth not on the books of Moral Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Moral Virtues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it be evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world, it is part of the Civil Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Sovereign Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great error, to call the Laws of Nature unwritten Law; whereof we see so many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.

The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of theJudge constituted by the Sovereign Authority, to hear and determine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to natural reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentic; not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Sovereign, whereby it becomes the Sovereigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.

But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Sovereign, but mayerr in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man's error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such Laws as are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in Laws immutable, such as are the Laws of Nature, they are no Laws to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one Judge passeth, another cometh; nay, Heaven and Earth shall pass; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall pass; for it is the Eternal Law of God. Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to natural Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own natural reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Nature, To punish the Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth himself Judicially, and is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth away for fear of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legal trial, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: But that flying for fear of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England. If a man (saith he) that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for fear flieth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himself of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proof against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight. Here you see, An Innocent man, Judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquittal, upon a Presumption in Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capital,) the Sentence ought to have been Capital: if the Presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proof shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law. For all Judges, Sovereign and subordinate, if they refuse to hear Proof, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofs offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein men's Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough to show, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Laws, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavil, than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore unless there be an Interpreter authorised by the Sovereign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Laws in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements. For a Judge may err in the Interpretation even of written Laws; but no error of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the general Sentence of the Sovereign.

In written Laws, men use to make a difference between the Letter,and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is only one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the literal sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literal sense is that, which the Legislator intended, should by the letter of the Law be signified. Now the Intention of the Legislator is always supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Sovereign. He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law do not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respite Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no special Law ordained. It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsely of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the Sovereign that another be made Judge, and himself Witness. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that isto say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study of the Laws. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the Statutes, and Constitutions of the Sovereign, alleged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the Sovereign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what he shall Judge; for it shall be given him what he shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what he shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings show it, and by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parliament in England were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Laws, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving Sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trials of Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not only of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complainant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not only of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not only determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority to inform them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unless it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.

The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Laws, are, first, A right understanding of that principal Law of Nature called Equity; which depending not on the reading of other men's Writings, but on the goodness of a man's own natural Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt of unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgement to divest himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.

The difference and division of the Laws, has been made in diversmanners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every man's proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Civil Laws. 1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles of the Prince, that is, of the Emperor; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.

2. The Decrees of the whole people of Rome (comprehending the Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Laws, at first, by the virtue of the Sovereign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the Emperors were not abrogated, remained Laws by the Authority Imperial. For all Laws that bind, are understood to be Laws by his authority that has power to repeal them. Somewhat like to these Laws, are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. The Decrees of the Common people (excluding the Senate,) when they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperors, remained Laws by the Authority Imperial. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.

4. Senateûs consulta, the Orders of the Senate; because when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the Emperor, that men should Consult the Senate, in stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of Counsel.

5. The Edicts of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as are the Chief Justices in the Courts of England.

6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperor gave Authority to interpret the Law, and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperor to observe: And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of England, are not properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.

7. Also, Unwritten Customs, (which in their own nature are an imitation of Law,) by the tacit consent of the Emperor, in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Laws.

Another division of Laws, is into Natural and Positive. Natural are those which have been Laws from all Eternity; and are called not only Natural, but also Moral Laws; consisting in the Moral Virtues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been from Eternity; but have been made Laws by the Will of those that have had the Sovereign Power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.

Again, of Positive Laws some are Humane, some Divine: Andof Human positive laws, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive are those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; nevertheless the Command is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himself,) but to public Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Laws are for the most part written together with the Laws Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all Laws are general Judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.

Divine Positive Laws (for Natural Laws being Eternal, andUniversal, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandments of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but only to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority of man to declare what be these Positive Laws of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver Laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How can a man without supernatural Revelation be assured of the Revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible: For though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him do, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisdom, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of God extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidences of special Revelation. Miracles are Marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by Natural, and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of Gods will; but only a belief; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater; or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for men's belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of Supernatural Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Laws; but a rejection of them all, except the Laws Natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernatural manner) was thus, This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee. Abrahams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have Sovereign power over their children, and servants. Again, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe Righteousness and Judgement, it is manifest, the obedience of his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Sovereign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandments, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandment; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the Commandments of the Common-wealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Moral Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Laws of the Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any man's reason; for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the name of them that have the Sovereign power; and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other Commandments of God, than are declared for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternal Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamental, andnot Fundamental: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamental Law signifieth. Nevertheless one may very reasonably distinguish Laws in that manner.

For a Fundamental Law in every Common-wealth is that, whichbeing taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamental Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Sovereign, whether a Monarch, or a Sovereign Assembly, without which the Commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Public good. Not Fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Laws concerning Controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Laws.

I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors; which nevertheless ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civil Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himself by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention: but the Civil Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Law may be safely stayed for. Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.

Likewise Laws and Charters are taken promiscuously for thesame thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Sovereign; and not Laws, but exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command, and Enjoin: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I have Given, I have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAP. XXVII. Of CRIMES, EXCUSES, and EXTENUATIONS.

A Sin, is not only a Transgression of a Law, but also anyContempt of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Laws at once. And therefore may consist, not only in the Commission of a Fact, or in the Speaking of Words by the Laws forbidden, or in the Omission of what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to transgress. For the purpose to break the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the Imagination only, of being possessed of another man's goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that saith, Thou shalt not covet: nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but damage, and displeasure, a Sin; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were real, is a Passion so adherent to the Nature both of man, and every other living creature, as to make it a Sin, were to make Sin of being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sins. But I confess it is safer to err on that hand, than on the other.

A CRIME, is a sin, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, orWord) of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sin; but not every sin a Crime. To intend to steal, or kill, is a sin, though it never appear in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a human Judge, it hath not the name of Crime: which distinction the Greeks observed, in the word ἁμάρτημα, and ἔγκλημα, or αἰτία; whereof the former, (which is translated Sin,) signifieth any swerving from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated Crime,) signify that sin only, whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for human accusation. In like manner the Latins by Peccatum, which is Sin, signify all manner of deviation from the Law; but by Crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean only such sins, as may be made appear before a Judge; and therefore are not mere Intentions.

From this relation of Sin to the Law, and of Crime to the Civil Law, may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sin ceaseth. But because the Law of Nature is eternal, Violation of Covenants, Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Moral virtue, can never cease to be Sin. Secondly, that the Civil Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused only by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightness of his own Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sin: if otherwise, his fact is Sin; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the Sovereign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Sovereign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood only of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.

The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding;or some error in Reasoning; or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again, Ignorance is of three sorts; of the Law, and of the Sovereign, and of the Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himself. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and persuade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Laws of this Country, though he be never so well persuaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not only because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that coming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civil Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civil Law is binding.

In the like manner, if the Civil Law of a man's own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civil Law, Excuseth not.

Ignorance of the Sovereign Power, in the place of a man's ordinaryresidence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excusethno man: For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Laws, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is thereby violated.

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deter men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the same Crime; it is the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because ifthe Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is liable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediately before alleged.

From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Error,) men areprone to violate the Laws, three ways. First, by Presumption of false Principles: as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Laws of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the only Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning, That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That Examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it self can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the success of them that commit it; and the same Fact be virtuous, or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same Laws standing) turnagain into a Crime, to the perpetual disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.

Secondly, by false Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civil; or by teaching for Laws, such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions offormer times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.

Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and precipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but only common experience, and a good natural wit; whereof no man thinks himself unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no less difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private business; much less in them that undertake a public charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.

Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one,is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or blood, or some other natural quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Sovereign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Laws, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselvesby the greatness of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting public Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Money, or other rewards.

And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popularmen, that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Laws, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their ownWisdom, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Laws with their public discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designs require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designs are too subtle to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own Wisdom. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civil War,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new Designs established: so that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darkness in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindness;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, (unless they be withal timorous,) are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.

As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousness, what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every man's experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindered, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continual, and unavoidable molestation; whereby either a man's patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: The former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousness are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easy, or uncertain punishments.

Of all Passions, that which inclineth men least to break the Laws,is Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the only thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Laws,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed through Fear.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear only of corporeal hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbs, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Sovereign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the Laws, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoid this, breaks the Law, and protects himself for the future, by the terror of his private revenge. This is a Crime: For the hurt is not Corporeal, but Fantastical, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custom not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which nevertheless, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Laws; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shown before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be real Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or another's Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private man's brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.

From these different sources of Crimes, it appears already, thatall Crimes are not (as the Stoics of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great, is made less. For though all Crimes do equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookedness, which the Stoics rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoics not observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it thenature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a man has no means to inform himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Laws of Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law Natural.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or die; and consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I do it not, I die presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained; Nature therefore compels him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himself any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money, nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another man's Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before alleged.

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another;are by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the Law, both the Author, and Actor are Criminals. From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Sovereign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himself, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the Sovereign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Sovereign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Sovereign Power, disclaim any Right essential to the Sovereignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Sovereign Power, that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is nevertheless a Sin, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Sovereignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evil consequence thereof. But if he not only disobey, but also resist a public Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,) upon complaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischief of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumptionof strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Laws; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false persuasion that it is lawful: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by error, after the error shown him, is conformable to the Law.

He, whose error proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, oran Interpreter of the Law publicly authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory pursuit of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by public Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same Authority controlleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denial of the Sovereign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or error thereof, to stand, or fall.

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, isa greater Crime, than if there have been many precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity, given by the Sovereign himself: And because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when thesame ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of human nature: but he that doth it with premeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to human society; all which in committing the Crime, he hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddenness of Passion sufficient for a total Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectify the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publicly, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former, there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Sovereign Power.

Those facts which the Law expressly condemneth, but the Lawmakerby other manifest signs of his will tacitly approveth, are less Crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two contradictory Laws; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the Sovereigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not only to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the Law condemneth Duels; the punishment is made capital: On the contrary part, he that refuseth Duel, is subject to contempt and scorn, without remedy; and sometimes by the Sovereign himself thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in War: If thereupon he accept Duel, considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the Sovereign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governors, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Laws themselves. And thought it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernatural grace to follow that Precept.

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischief of their Effects,First, the same fact, when it redounds to the damage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not only in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt only in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplies to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live profanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the Sovereign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisdom, as that his counsels are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not only commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandal they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.

Also Facts of hostility against the present state of the Commonwealth,are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men: For the damage extends it self to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the Representative of the Commonwealth, be it a Monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latins understand by Crimina laesae Majestatis, and consist in design, or act, contrary to a Fundamental Law.

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, aregreater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive money to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater sum; because not only he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered useless, and occasion ministered to force, and private revenges.

Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Public treasure, or Revenues,is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to rob the public, is to rob many at once.

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of public Ministry, the Counterfeitingof public Seals, or public Coin, than counterfeiting of a private man's person, or his seal; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the damage of many.

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime,is that, where the damage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, than any other injury, life preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limb, greater, than the spoiling a man of his goods.

And the spoiling a man of his goods, by Terror of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some less sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the particular, but the general inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harm, than the present grief of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Laws of the Greeks, Romans, and other both ancient, and modern Commonwealths; supposing the true cause of such grief to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own virtue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Sovereign, (though he have surrendered his Power to the Civil Law,) because he had it originally by Nature. And to Rob a poor man, is a greater Crime, than to rob a rich man; because 'tis to the poor a more sensible damage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other Crime proposed.

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, notonly to some Private men, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when the accusation is in the name of the Commonwealth, is called Public Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the Pleas according thereunto called Public, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Sovereign, the plea is a Public plea.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of PUNISHMENTS, and REWARDS.

APUNISHMENT, is an Evil inflicted by public Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.

Before I infer any thing from this definition, there is a questionto be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the Sovereignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himself not. But to covenant to assist the Sovereign, in doing hurt to another, unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also showed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only; and (excepting the limits set him by natural Law) as entire, as in the condition of mere Nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.

From the definition of Punishment, I infer, First, that neitherprivate revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled Punishment; because they proceed not from public Authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publicfavour, is not a Punishment; because no new evil is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is only left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evil inflicted by public Authority, withoutprecedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by public Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Fourthly, that the evil inflicted by usurped power, and Judgeswithout Authority from the Sovereign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of public Authority.

Fifthly, that all evil which is inflicted without intention, or possibilityof disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Laws, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature,divers hurtful consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himself slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sickness by the doing of some unlawful act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contained in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, or contentmentthat naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be less than the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it self, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excess is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aim of Punishment is not a revenge, but terror; and the terror of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a less, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Ninthly, Harm inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Lawthat forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore Harm inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Commonwealth,is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by public Authority, which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.

Lastly, Harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fallsnot under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it, all the Harms that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evil is lawful. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberately deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denies such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Sovereign Power.

The first, and most general distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandment of Man; and are either Corporal, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixed of these.

Corporal Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.

And of these, some be Capital, some Less than Capital. Capital,is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Less than Capital, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporal Paine, not in its own nature mortal. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death follow not in the intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not to be esteemed Capital, though the harm prove mortal by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Sum of Money, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for money. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather money, from such as shall transgress the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of privilege, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the money: except where the Law is Natural, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it. As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vain, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to swear, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Sum of Money to be paid, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evil, as is made Dishonorable;or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdom, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other singular mark of the Sovereigns favour. The former, (though they may fail by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and therefore the loss of them is not Punishment. But the later, may be taken away by the public authority that made them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment, is when a man is by public Authority deprivedof liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punished, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the later is Punishment, because Evil, and inflicted by public Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an external obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the general name of a Prison; or an Island, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to work, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Galleys; or be it a Chain, or any other such impediment.

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemnedto depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certain part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a public commandment to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero says, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but calls it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the mere change of air is no Punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of men's wills to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the damage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawful enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same. But if he be withal deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lieth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, areagainst the Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Sovereign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendering of Evil for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.

But the Infliction of what evil soever, on an Innocent man, thatis not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original Right of Nature to make war; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent, and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of hisown People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberately deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not only to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of war, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but war renewed.

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract,it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Sovereign of a Common wealth appointeth a Salary to any public Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to perform his office; otherwise, he is bound only in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requital. For though men have no lawful remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private business, to serve the public, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the Institution of the Commonwealth, unless the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Sovereign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Soldier, may demand the wages of his warfare, as a debt.

The benefit which a Sovereign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear ofsome power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaries; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the Sovereign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Sovereign (considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publicTreasure; and others uncertain, and casual, proceeding from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases hurtful to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of suits; for the more suits, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it self, as many Causes as it can. But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be increased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbs and joints of a Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himself to Government;) together with the great power of his Governor, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud. There is nothing, saith he, on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride. But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Laws he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Laws of Nature he is bound to obey.

CHAP. XXIX. Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLUTION of a Common-wealth.

Though nothing can be immortal, which mortals make;yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Laws of Nature, or as Justice it self, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crazy building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.

Of which, this is one, That a man to obtain a Kingdom, is sometimes content with less Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required. From whence it cometh to pass, that when the exercise of the Power laid by, is for the public safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebel; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into boils and scabs. And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not always (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by foreign Commonwealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastics to the Commonwealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himself,) increased to a degree, inconsistent with the Sovereign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French.

Nor does this happen in Monarchy only. For whereas the stile of the ancient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the wars between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one only Action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the war for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readiness, even at the gates of their City; such damage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth,that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge of Good and Evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere Nature, where there are no Civil Laws; and also under Civil Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evil actions, is the Civil Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is always Representative of the Commonwealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Another doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, is, that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evil. For a man's Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, thought he that is subject to no Civil Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the public Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sovereign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

It hath been also commonly taught, That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernatural Inspiration, or Infusion. which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evil; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civil Government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joining the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Natural Reason, cannot stand together.

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth,is this, That he that hath the Sovereign Power, is subject to the Civil Laws. It is true, that Sovereigns are all subject to the Laws of Nature; because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Laws which the Sovereign himself, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to Laws, is to be subject to the Commonwealth, that is to the Sovereign Representative, that is to himself; which is not subjection, but freedom from the Laws. Which error, because it setteth the Laws above the Sovereign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth,is, That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Sovereign. Every man has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it only from the Sovereign Power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have equal Right to the same. But if the Right of the Sovereign also be excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from foreign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Sovereign Representative to their Goods; much less to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Sovereign himself.

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essenceof a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, That the Sovereign Power may be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Laws, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of differentGovernment in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the form already settled. So the people of the Jews were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations: So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocratical, and Democratical factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the form of their Government. For the constitution of man's nature, is of it self subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicit them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot bloods, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nails, till they can endure the smart no longer.

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of themost frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the ancient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightful impression, of the great exploits of war, achieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withal a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civil wars, produced by the imperfection of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawful. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter. In sum, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venom: Which Venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dog, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or fear of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a Dog: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democratical writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.

As there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Souls in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Souls, (that is, more Sovereigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Sovereignty, Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civil; working on men's minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signify nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdom, as it were a Kingdom of Fairies, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civil Power, and the Power of the Commonwealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making (anons, and granting Faculties, implieth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Sovereign, another Supreme; where one can make Laws, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdom divided in it self, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporal, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdoms, and every Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is Sin, it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sin being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civil Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who both will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdom, either the Civil, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly, and then there is no Sovereignty but the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporal, and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporal. When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of Civil war, and Dissolution. For the Civil Authority being more visible, and standing in the clearer light of natural reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spiritual, though it stand in the darkness of School distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darkness, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Commonwealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsy, or Falling-sickness (which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body Natural. For as in this Disease, there is an unnatural spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the Soul in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politic, when the Spiritual power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terror of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civil Power (which is the Soul of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby Distract the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civil war.

Sometimes also in the merely Civil government, there be morethan one Soul: As when the Power of levying money, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a general Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Laws, (which is the Rational faculty,) on the accidental consent, not only of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Laws; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixed Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdom of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reign, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the general Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another Assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Sovereign, but three Persons, and three Sovereigns.

To what Disease in the Natural Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, arms, breast; and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, asare of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Money, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of war. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Sovereigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it cometh to pass, that the Sovereign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Commonwealth, (finding the passage of money to the public Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it self, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it self as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by stratagems of Law, to obtain little sums, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Commonwealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their natural course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplied from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbs; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Blood; and before it can do that, contenteth it self with the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venom into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dieth.

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, whichresembleth the Pleurisy; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farms of the Public Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisy, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painful stitches.

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unless the Commonwealthhave very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Sovereign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Laws, to follow a man, of whose virtues, and designs they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy, because an Army is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himself the affections of his Army, made himself Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderategreatness of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expense of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputingagainst absolute Power, by pretenders to Political Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually meddling with the Fundamental Laws, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Worms, which Physicians call Ascarides.

We may further add, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burden, and with less danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expense.

Lastly, when in a war (foreign, or intestine,) the enemies get afinal Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Sovereign, is the public Soul, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcass of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soul. For though the Right of a Sovereign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himself out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it self is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Sovereignty to re-enter.